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Abstract 
 
Popular conceptions of Pakistan are visions of violence, terrorism, and radical Islam.  
However, the idea of Pakistan originates with poet-philosopher Muhammad Iqbal (d. 
1938) who cited a need for a state where Indian Muslims could live as true Muslims. 
Embedding his religious philosophy in poetry, Iqbal was a well-educated, progressive 
thinker, and had a variety of influences, including Friedrich Nietzsche (d. 1900).  
Nietzsche, sometimes called “The Great Atheist,” is most well-known for his 
pronouncement, “God is dead.”  This thesis explores the apparent irony of how Iqbal, a 
deeply religious Muslim, took such philosophical inspiration from an apparent enemy of 
religion like Nietzsche.       
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Introduction 
 
As humanity entered the modern era, with its fetish for empiricism and 
Aristotelian logic as the basis of certainty, metaphysics and religion as sources of 
knowledge were called into question.  The dominant trends within modernist thought 
view religion as a component of life to be examined, analyzed, and understood in the 
context of other human pursuits, but not as a reliable or autonomous source of 
knowledge.  Post-modernity’s suspicion of claims of unique access to Truth opts for the 
relativity of all narratives.  Rather than discarding religious claims, postmodern thinkers 
generally focus on the contexts of specific religious claims and their role within human 
experience.  Although post-modernity’s paradigm significantly expands religious 
scholarship, it is a double-edged sword.  Such perspectives supply the necessary objective 
distance for the scholarly study of sensitive topics like religion.  On the other hand, they 
can marginalize religion at best, and perhaps promote cynical or dismissive attitudes 
toward religion.   
 To maintain the necessary scholarly rigor while respecting the value of religion in 
the lives of individuals and societies is not an easy task.  For the purposes of this 
exploration, religion will be treated as an alternative type of metaphysical speculation 
seeking Truth.  It is therefore viewed as an integral part of philosophical tradition and 
practice.  Although this view is controversial within modern philosophical scholarship, 
evaluating the religious philosophies of two distinct religious philosophers otherwise 
would do great injustice to their work.  It is therefore incumbent to view religion and 
philosophy as intrinsically linked, and as two equally valid methodologies for acquiring 
Truth.  To discuss Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophy and dismiss its religious components 
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would be absurd.  Equally, Iqbal’s philosophy without its religious aspects is incomplete.  
Such claims stem from the philosophical nature in which they approached religion.  Thus, 
this thesis assumes interconnectedness between religion and philosophy, and will focus 
specifically on how Iqbal’s and Nietzsche’s exist both harmoniously and discordantly. 
 Analyzing discord between two religious philosophies raises the important point 
of the univocality and/or multivocality of the term “religion.”  Whether this term has one 
or many meanings shapes the formation of a religious philosophy.  Further complicating 
comparative religious study is deciding if univocal definitions of religion contain 
opportunities for multiple interpretations.  Conversely, it is tempting to assume 
multivocal conceptions of religion permit multiple interpretations of religion, but this is 
not correct either.  Rather than create endless semantic arguments about a nebulous term, 
the difficulty in defining religion highlights the contentious nature of the subject.  Finally, 
this thesis adds to the difficulty by comparing conceptions of religion across cultural, 
temporal, and linguistic divides.  
 Appreciating the complexity of the issues, it is again necessary to draw upon the 
connection between religion and philosophy.  Utilizing the scholarly distance provided by 
post-modernity, one must realize that modern conceptions of philosophy as separate from 
religion are inherently flawed.  Philosophy is inextricably related to religion and vice 
versa.  Modernity’s insistence that philosophy and religion are separate tools to answer 
religious questions subordinates religion to philosophy or philosophy to religion 
depending on one’s bias.  Iqbal and Nietzsche show this paradigm to be unsuitable.  To 
understand and assess the relationship between philosophy, religion, Iqbal, and 
Nietzsche, requires treating philosophy and religion as equal partners in posing and 
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answering existential questions.  The end result of viewing religion and philosophy 
connected in this way is religious philosophy.   
Sir Allama Muhammad Iqbal 
 This thesis’s focal figure is the person and religious philosophy of Sir Allama 
Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938).  A brilliant philosopher, devout Muslim, gifted poet, and 
driven activist, Iqbal is many things to many people.  To some, he is an example of a 
progressive, modern, and devout Muslim, while others see him as a dreaded 
“Westernizer.”  For Pakistanis, he is the intellectual father of their state.  Whether or not 
this idea is viewed positively is ultimately the choice of the individual.  To academics, 
Iqbal is a fascinating example of reconciling Islamic ideals with modernity.  He is akin to 
a twentieth century al-Ghazzali—a synthesizer of Islam, mysticism, and modernity.  
Moreover, he promoted the idea of a religious state without arousing trite and offensive 
images of a barbaric theocracy.  However, what is most fascinating, and the inspiration 
for this thesis, is his unique, personally empowering religious philosophy drawing upon, 
yet remaining independent of, Nietzsche.   
 The importance of Iqbal’s religious philosophy and its nuances are the primary 
focuses of this thesis.  His audacious revisions to Islam remain tangible within academia 
and in the minds of South Asian Muslims.  Although his brainchild, Pakistan, has not 
become the state of his dreams, Iqbal still represents what some modern commentators 
claim they desire from the Muslim-majority (the parts of world containing Muslim 
majorities) world.  Delving into his religious philosophy, this thesis will examine his 
unique context and background.  To elucidate Iqbal’s religious philosophy, his seminal 
work, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, will be the primary source used.  
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Governing this choice is the fact that it avoids translation, as the work is based on 
lectures given in English.  Supplementing philosophical ideas found in The 
Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam are references to Iqbal’s poetry in 
translation. 
Friedrich Nietzsche 
 Early readings of Friedrich Nietzsche’s works (1844-1900) were dominated by 
offended and theologically motivated European Christians.  Post-modern intellectual 
paradigms, however, reevaluated his writings to better contextualize and understand 
Nietzsche’s thought.  Carl Jung said, “Nietzsche was no atheist, but his god was dead.”1  
Although most readers consider him an atheist, taking him at his word, it is healthy to 
question this assumption.  Was he the “Great Atheist?”  If so, what kind of atheist was 
he?  If he was not, what kind of religious individual was he?  Was there a religiosity to 
his atheism?  This thesis will not seek to provide answers to these questions, but will use 
them to explore Nietzsche’s religious philosophy.   
 Similar to Iqbal, Nietzsche is many things to many people.  He is both the 
champion for atheists and skeptics worldwide, but also the primary religio-philosophical 
pillar for deeply religious Lutheran pastor Dietrich Bonhoeffer.2  Clearly more lies 
underneath the writings and “atheism” of Nietzsche than is commonly believed.  Beyond 
understanding who Nietzsche is, it is also important to explore why he is important.  This 
is particularly important for analyzing influence on Iqbal.  A central question guiding this 
thesis is how could a devout Muslim find Nietzsche both inspiring and repulsive?   
 
                                                 
1
 Carl Jung, Psychology and Religion (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1938), 103. 
2
 Roy Jackson, Nietzsche and Islam (London, New York: Routledge, 2007), 43. 
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Hypotheses 
 Scholars of religion and philosophy have discussed and written about the 
similarities between the religious philosophies of Muhammad Iqbal and Friedrich 
Nietzsche since the 1970s.3  There is no debate regarding the direction of influence, but 
the degree to which Nietzsche influenced Iqbal is contested.  Unfortunately, less attention 
is given to the underlying reasons for the similarities and differences between each 
scholar’s religious philosophy.  Most analysis investigating the underlying reasons gives 
categorical answers: Iqbal translated the religio-philosophy of Nietzsche, or the 
similarities are merely coincidental.4    
 The former conclusion is drawn by the remarkable similarities that do exist when 
Iqbal’s and Nietzsche’s philosophies are compared.  However, this answer is both 
reductionist and does not actually explain why the similarities exist beyond stating that 
Iqbal read Nietzsche.  The latter idea, positing mere coincidence, is also deeply flawed.  
This argument wholly ignores Iqbal’s years spent studying in Europe and uses his 
religious beliefs as a way to shield him from godless Western thought.  Although Iqbal’s 
own writings indicate that he felt a certain pity for the “godless” Nietzsche, such feelings 
did not preclude his incorporating Nietzschean principles into his own religious 
philosophy.   
 This thesis posits an alternative conclusion.  First, it posits that each philosopher’s 
religious philosophy was original.  Additionally, for the present purposes of this thesis, 
                                                 
3
 Hafeez Malik, ed., Iqbal: Poet Philosopher of Pakistan, (New York, London: Columbia University Press, 
1971). 
4
 See chapters 5-6, 9, 14-16 in Hafeez Malik (ed.), Iqbal: Poet-Philosopher of Pakistan (); Roy Jackson, 
Nietzsche and Islam, 62-63.  Chapters 5, 6, and 16 tend to overemphasize Iqbal’s differences with 
Nietzsche and fail to capture the full extent of Iqbal’s encounter and admiration of Nietzsche.  Chapters 9, 
14, and 15 conversely tend to overemphasize Iqbal’s similarities with Nietzsche.  Some authors appear to 
argue for a middle ground, but this claim is not reflected in their analysis of Iqbal’s relationship to 
Nietzsche.   
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the focus will be on the religio-philosophical work of Muhammad Iqbal as it relates to the 
religious philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche.  Although it is known that Iqbal read 
Nietzsche while in Europe, being influenced by him not inherently detract from Iqbal’s 
originality.  The contexts in which these authors were writing and thinking differed 
greatly.  Therefore their messages and meanings differed in terms of what they wanted 
their audience to understand.  Generally stated, this thesis posits that similarities and 
differences exist between Iqbal and Nietzsche’s thought, but Iqbal selectively syncretized 
principles found in Nietzsche’s works into his own philosophy. 
 Further exploring this idea of selective syncretism is understanding Iqbal’s goal 
for his religious philosophy.  It is clear that Iqbal’s religious philosophy is not for its own 
sake, but part of the Indian Muslim liberation movement from British colonial rule.  
Nietzsche’s goal was the liberation of Europe from the shackles of any system hampering 
individualism.  These contextually different goals will be explored as integral to the 
overall understanding of convergence and divergence between their religious 
philosophies.  
 This thesis also explores the possibility that the convergence and divergence in 
the religious philosophies of Nietzsche and Iqbal can be explained by each philosopher’s 
conceptualization of religion.  Each author understood religion in both similar and 
different ways, giving rise to the observed convergence and divergence between their 
philosophies.  Their conceptions of religion were products of their independent thought 
and geo-historical context.  Guiding this hypothesis are several questions:  What was 
each philosopher’s “definition” of religion?  What was religion’s function?  Was religion 
socially constructed to serve a societal purpose?  What was religion’s role in the life of an 
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individual or society?  Answers to these questions lie within Iqbal and Nietzsche’s 
writings.  Thus, this thesis will draw heavily upon their primary sources. 
 Finally, this thesis will discuss Iqbal’s understanding of Nietzsche.  Therefore, 
instances in which Iqbal praises and criticizes Nietzsche will be analyzed because such 
statements will elucidate Iqbal’s reading of Nietzsche.  Specific questions regarding this 
aspect of the thesis include: To what degree could Iqbal read Nietzsche in German?  Was 
Iqbal aware of the context and the audience to which Nietzsche was writing?  Did Iqbal 
understand the stylistic and linguistic nuances of German well enough to detect sarcasm 
and metaphor?  This last question is of particular import when dealing with Nietzsche’s 
later works such as Thus Spake Zarathustra.  
 
 
Relevance 
 An exploration of the simultaneous interrelatedness and uniqueness of two 
distinct philosophers is relevant to both scholarly and popular discourse.  Since 
September 11, 2001, concerns regarding the mixture of Islam, politics, society, culture 
and modernity/post-modernity have increased.  A flawed question often posed is, “Is 
Islam compatible with any aspects of modern/post-modern life?”  This thesis addresses 
this idea by exploring Iqbal’s religious philosophy and places it in the context of 
twentieth century modernity.  His religio-philosophical arguments and positions 
revolutionized the way South Asian Muslims view philosophy, Islam, and modernity.  
Some specific concerns cited by many in contemporary discussions are: How does Islam 
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view individual rights?  How does Islam view philosophy?  How does Islam view the 
individual in religion? 
 This thesis does not seek to engage in apologetics for Iqbal’s or Muslim 
philosophy.  The individual reader must decide the degree to which these questions are 
answered in a satisfactory manner.  This thesis will, however, show that Iqbal’s religious 
philosophy involved a unique syncretism with Nietzsche’s religious philosophy.  To 
many this is an odd hybridization of a deeply religious philosopher with the philosophy 
of an atheist.  Textual references and analysis will demonstrate the relationship between 
these two religious philosophers.  Broadly speaking, this thesis seeks to explore a curious 
religio-philosophical relationship between two religious philosophers who met only 
through the written word.  This unique interaction between two contextually different 
individuals led to the development of a fascinating strain of thought within Islam. 
 - 12 - 
Chapter 1: Iqbal’s Thought and Philosophy 
 
Iqbal’s Family Background  
 Iqbal was born in Sialkot, Punjab, in present-day Pakistan on November 9, 1877.  
Iqbal’s father, Nur Muhammad was a tailor by trade, meaning Iqbal’s family, by today’s 
standards, was likely middle class.  Additionally, Nur Muhammad was a devout Sufi 
Muslim, which helped Iqbal’s family gain notoriety within Sialkot.1  An interesting note 
about Iqbal’s family background is that he came from a family of Kashmiri Brahmin 
priests.2  Biographical records indicate that Iqbal’s family converted to Islam 
approximately two centuries before Iqbal’s birth.  His family’s connection to Vedic 
priesthood, Kashmiri ethnicity, and two centuries practicing Islam likely gave Iqbal’s 
family a great deal of social capital within Sialkot.   
Iqbal’s Early Education 
 Iqbal’s early education appeared to be home-schooling under the tutelage of his 
father.3  Nur Muhammad’s education instilled a reverence for the Qur’an and mystical 
Sufi practices, giving Iqbal both intellectual and spiritual knowledge of Islam.  His 
earliest formal education was in the Arabic, Persian, and Urdu languages at the hand of 
local scholar Mir Hassan Shah.4  After receiving his religious and language education, his 
father sent him to receive a “Western” education.   
 Iqbal was educated at the Scotch Mission School, run by Christian missionaries.5  
Here Iqbal gained an appreciation for Western secular disciplines, and exposure to 
                                                 
1
 “Biography of Allama Iqbal,” The Iqbal Academy Pakistan, 
http://www.allamaiqbal.com/person/person.htm. 
2
 K. C. Kanda, Allama Iqbal: Selected Poetry (Elgin, IL: New Dawn Press Group, 2006) 2. 
3
 Ibid. 
4
 Ibid., 3. 
5
 Ibid. 
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English and Christianity.  Although he maintained a standard Islamic position regarding 
Christian orthodoxy (i.e. the nature of Jesus), he did not criticize Christianity as did other 
Muslim scholars of his time.   
 After matriculating from the Scotch Mission School, Iqbal went to the 
Government College in Lahore where he met one of his greatest intellectual influences, 
Sir Thomas Arnold.6  Sir Thomas was the resident Islamic and Oriental scholar at the 
Government College and a deep admirer of Islam.7  His philosophical and historical 
perspectives on Islam made him a vocal critic of European misconceptions surrounding 
Islam.8  While at Government College, Iqbal pursued both a Bachelor and Master of the 
Arts in Arabic, English and Philosophy bringing him into close working contact with Sir 
Thomas.9  Iqbal was such an admirer of Sir Thomas that when he returned to England in 
1904, Iqbal dedicated several lines of poetry to him.10     
 An important note that must be made regarding Iqbal’s education in British India 
as well as Europe is the lack of actual documentation detailing his studies and the degrees 
he received.  This is not to say that Iqbal was not highly educated, but there is room for 
healthy skepticism given this lack of documentation.  Often all that is known regarding 
his education is that he received a degree at a specific school or university in a particular 
year.  Settling this matter would require reviewing degree documents at the locations 
where he studied to determine if the universities have records of his various 
matriculations, which is beyond the scope of this thesis.     
                                                 
6
 Ibid. 
7
 Ibid. 
8
 Sheila McDonough, The Authority of the Past (Chambersburg: American Academy of Religion, 1970), 
16. 
9
 Kanda, Selected Poetry, 3. 
10
 Ibid., 3-4. 
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European Education 
 Following his graduation from the Government College in Lahore, Iqbal arrived 
in England in 1905 at Cambridge University.11  Already holding degrees in philosophy 
and other concentrations, Iqbal is reported to have received another degree in philosophy 
from Cambridge University in 1906.12  Additionally, he earned a law degree from Middle 
Temple in London and passed his barrister’s exam in 1906.13  Finally, Iqbal left the 
United Kingdom for Germany and enrolled in Ludwig-Maxmilians Universität in Munich 
where he received his Ph.D. in Philosophy in 1908 under the supervision of Dr. Friedrich 
Hommel.14  His dissertation, written in English, was entitled The Development of 
Metaphysics in Persia.15  What is puzzling about his dissertation submitted to a German 
university under the supervision of a German scholar in English is the evidence 
suggesting Iqbal knew German well enough to conduct research.16  
 According to an often cited hadith (saying or deed attributed to Prophet 
Muhammad), Muslims are commanded to “seek knowledge even if it is in China.”  
Iqbal’s breadth and many years of education certainly embody the ideal of seeking 
knowledge.  A gifted legal scholar, philosopher, and poet, Iqbal returned to Lahore in 
1908.  Whether or not he fully attained all of these degrees in three years is a matter of 
further scholarly analysis.  This point aside, his education in both Islamic studies and 
                                                 
11
 Mir Muntasir, “Allama Iqbal Brief Life Sketch,” The Iqbal Academy Pakistan, 
http://www.allamaiqbal.com. 
12
 Ibid. 
13
 Ibid. 
14
 Dr. Iqbal Society of North America, “Life of Iqbal,” http://www.disna.us/LIFE_OF_IQBAL.html, 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 M. A. H. Hobohm, “Muhammad Iqbal and Germany: A Correspondence of the Heart,” Iqbal Review: 
Journal of the Iqbal Academy Pakistan, 41, 4 (2000), 
http://www.allamaiqbal.com/publications/journals/review/oct00/index.html. This claim is based on Iqbal’s 
citation of German research in his Ph.D. dissertation and his letter correspondence with his tutor Emma 
Wegenast. In these letters he laments his schlechte Deutsch (“bad German”), suggesting a lack of 
confidence which may explain his decision to write his dissertation in English. 
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philosophy at European institutions demonstrates a broad general knowledge of various 
topics across contexts.  Upon his return, he received a teaching position in the Faculty of 
Philosophy, teaching at Government College until 1911, when he began to practice law 
privately until 1934.17   
 
Iqbal’s Adult Years 
 Upon returning to Lahore, Iqbal began writing poetry advocating the removal of 
British colonial rule from British India (present day India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh) and 
Muslim spiritual revival.18  However, as politics and power structures began to change in 
South Asia, Iqbal’s writings shifted from unified messages of Indian nationalism to 
messages exclusively directed to South Asian Muslims.19   
 He began his involvement in politics in 1908 when he became a member of the 
Executive Council of the British branch of the All-India Muslim League.20  The All-India 
Muslim League was an organization formed in the early twentieth century by Indian 
Muslims who advocated an independent Indian state while retaining strong ties to Britain.  
However, the group differed regarding the post-independence status of the sizeable 
Muslim minority in British India.  The group’s consensus was any independence outcome 
would require a semi-autonomous Muslim state to protect the rights of Muslims.  
However, it is important to note that the group, and Iqbal for many years, did not 
advocate the creation of a Muslim state and a Hindu state that followed British partition 
in 1947.  
                                                 
17
 Muntasir, “Allama Iqbal Brief Life Sketch.”; McDonough, Authority, 16. 
18
 Kanda, Selected Poetry, 10. 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 Muntasir, “Allama Iqbal Brief Life Sketch.”  
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 Between the years of 1908 and 1927, Iqbal wrote religiously, philosophically, and 
politically charged poetry and prose.  In 1930, he was elected to preside over the Indian 
Muslim League’s annual meeting in Allahabad.21  It was at this meeting that he first 
expressed the idea of a semi-autonomous state for Muslims within a broader Indian state, 
in line with the early ideas of the All-India Muslim League.22  This suggestion was 
preceded by decades of discontent within the Muslim population of India.  Examples of 
tension were various violent clashes between Muslims and Hindus (and at times Sikhs) in 
the 1920s, and poor electoral performances of Muslim candidates in municipal elections 
despite some areas having substantial Muslim populations.  These events led Muslims to 
demand an autonomous region to preserve cultural self-determination instead of the 
likely democratic of political and cultural domination of Hindus.  Concerning the issue of 
independent India, Iqbal was a member of the Round Table Conferences in London that 
discussed the future political status of India in 1930 and 1931.23   
 The end of Iqbal’s life is marked by poor health.24  Despite health problems, he 
remained dedicated to both religious revival, philosophical inquiry, and national/political 
causes.  In 1935 that he was elected president of the Anjuman-i Himayat-i Islam 
(“Association for the Service/Protection/Propagation [of the Honor] of Islam”) which 
provided him with a new forum and position to promulgate his ideas.25  The group’s 
general purpose was to provide a forum of expression for politically active Muslims 
within British India.  After chronic health problems, Iqbal’s health declined rapidly.  In 
                                                 
21
 Pakistan Times. 2004. http://pakistantimes.net/2004/11/09/specialreport.htm. 
22
 Pakistan Times. 2004. http://pakistantimes.net/2004/11/09/specialreport.htm; Kanda, Selected Poetry, 17. 
23
 Pakistan Times. 2004. http://pakistantimes.net/2004/11/09/specialreport.htm.; Kanda, Selected Poetry, 
17. 
24
 Kanda, Selected Poetry, 17; “Iqbal in Years.” Iqbal Academy Pakistan. http://www.allamaiqbal.com/. 
25
 Kanda, Selected Poetry, 9; “Iqbal in Years.” Iqbal Academy Pakistan.  
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the early hours of April 21, 1938, Sir Allama Muhammad Iqbal died, missing his dream 
of seeing a Muslim state by nine years.   
Overview of His Major Works 
 Unlike other philosophers, the bulk of his religious philosophy is in poetry rather 
than prose.  This does not mean Iqbal avoided prose, but he knew his target audience, 
South Asian Muslims, preferred poetry to other media.26  A practical reason for using 
poetry was the levels of illiteracy among his target audience.27  With these reasons in 
mind, Iqbal wrote large volumes of poetry that were recited at community gatherings and 
Anjuman-i Himayat-i Islam meetings.28  However, articulating religio-philosophical ideas 
requires a systematic and organized approach.  Such an approach is found in The 
Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, which has the added benefit of being an 
English work.  Although heavy emphasis will be placed on The Reconstruction of 
Religious Thought in Islam, his translated poetic works will be used to augment 
conclusions drawn from The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam.   
 A second point to cover before delving into Iqbal’s thought is his use and choice 
of language.  Of his published languages, he uses English when he wants to be 
systematic, and uses Persian and Urdu when he wants to reach his mostly illiterate and 
non-English speaking target audience of South Asian Muslims.  The choice of Persian is 
natural, given its official use in the Mughal court and its popularity among Kashmiri 
poets in the nineteenth century.29  Urdu is, to say the least, a disputed language, and 
                                                 
26
 Chitralekha Zutshi, Languages of Belonging: Islam, Regional Identity, and the Making of Kashmir (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 149. 
27
 Ibid. 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Ibid., 52, 324. 
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inextricably linked to Muslim subcontinent nationalism.30  It shares many similarities 
with Hindi, but draws heavily upon Arabic and Persian vocabulary, and uses the Perso-
Arabic script.31  As nationalist movements emerged across the subcontinent, they 
required standard languages to articulate their demands.  For Vedic Indians, Hindi 
became the preferred medium, drawing heavily from Sanskrit for vocabulary as well as 
script.32  Although other factors exist regarding the development of Urdu as a national 
language, for many Muslim Indians, the connection to Islam gave impetus to develop 
Urdu as a distinct language from Hindi.33  Curiously, Iqbal wrote more poetry in Persian 
than Urdu, but reasons suggesting he felt Persian was “superior” to Urdu are specious.34  
Pragmatically, poems in Persian could have wider appeal across the Muslim-majority 
world and among educated South Asians.35  Urdu, by no means any less expressive, 
could reach the greatest number of people because of its closer ties to local subcontinent 
languages.36 
The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam 
 Iqbal’s prose masterpiece, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam is 
actually a compiled series of lectures Iqbal gave between December 1928 and January 
1929 at the Muslim Associations of Madras, Hyderabad, and Aligarh University.37  The 
                                                 
30
 Ali Asani, “At the Crossroads of Indic and Iranian Civilizations: Sindhi Literary Culture,” in Literary 
Cultures in History: South Asian Reconstructions (Berkley, Los Angeles, London: University of California 
Press, 2003), 640. 
31
 Harish Trivedi, “The Progress of Hindi Part 2: Hindi and the Nation,” in Literary Cultures (see note 32), 
640. 
32
 Ali Asani, “Crossroads,” (see note 32), 640. 
33
 Sheldon Pollock, “Introduction,” in Literary Cultures (see note 32), 33. 
34
 Kanda, Selected Poetry, 10, 17.  The differences in the amounts of Urdu and Persian poetry may reflect 
style preferences, but Kanda’s claim that Iqbal felt Persian was superior to Urdu requires support, which he 
does not provide. 
35
 Ibid., 10. 
36
 Harish Trivedi, “Progress of Hindi,” in Literary Cultures (see note 32), 967-69. 
37
 “Introduction to The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam.” The Iqbal Academy Pakistan. 
http://www.allamaiqbal.com/. 
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six lectures were compiled in 1930, and eventually published in English by Oxford 
University Press with an additional chapter “Is Religion Possible?” in 1934.38  This work 
represents the clearest expression of Iqbal’s religious philosophy and his concerns about 
Islam in South Asia.  Throughout the lectures he covers epistemology, religious 
experience, conceptions of God and religion, the Self, “the Spirit of Muslim Culture,” the 
inherent dynamism within Islam, and whether religion, as he has defined it, is possible.39   
 A prominent feature in this work is his frequent reference, both approving and 
critical, to European philosophers.  The most noteworthy mentions are Nietzsche, Alfred 
Whitehead, and Henri Bergson, with brief references to William James and Darwin.  Also 
characteristic of this work are references to Qur’anic verses and Persian/South Asian 
poets and mystics, reinforcing his points among Muslim audiences.  The most significant 
aspect of the book is that it represents Iqbal’s outline for preserving Islam’s core 
principles while embracing modernity.  It also demonstrates Iqbal’s selective syncretism 
regarding Nietzsche’s philosophy.  The idea of selective syncretism describes Iqbal’s 
reading of various philosophers, particularly Nietzsche, in which he incorporates what he 
believes are Islamic principles central to his own philosophical ideas, and applies them to 
his context. 
‘Ilm al-Iqtisad 
 Chronologically, Iqbal’s earliest work is ‘Ilm al-Iqtisad (The Science of 
Economics) published in Urdu.  This work explores how economic principles relate to 
other scientific disciplines, daily life, and social justice.  He argues for altering social 
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practices to conform to economic theory to achieve social justice.40  Not only is social 
justice central to Iqbal’s understanding of Islam, but it is a recurring theme within the 
Qur’an: 
 O ye who believe! stand out firmly for justice, as witnesses to Allah, even as against yourselves, 
or your  parents, or your kin, and whether it be (against) rich or poor: for Allah can best protect both.  
Follow not  the lusts (of your hearts), lest ye swerve, and if ye distort (justice) or decline to do justice, 
verily Allah is  well-acquainted with all that ye do.41  
Additionally, Fazlur Rahman states in Major Themes of the Qur’an: “There is no doubt 
that a central aim of the Qur’an is to establish a viable social order on earth that will be 
just and ethically based.”42  ‘Ilm ul-Iqtisad was most likely directed toward educated, 
literate Urdu speakers, and represents the period in Iqbal’s life when he targeted such 
elites to enact social change.  He eventually abandoned this elitist approach, opting 
instead for a broad appeal through religious reformation.   
The Development of Metaphysics in Persia 
 Iqbal’s next major work was his Ph.D. dissertation, The Development of 
Metaphysics in Persia, which traces Persian philosophical thought historically via 
important Persian religious figures such as Zoroaster and Baha’u’llah.43  Relevant to this 
thesis is his appreciation for the historical development of Islamo-Persian thought from 
non-Islamic sources, and his conclusion that Sufism is a natural consequence of Greco-
Islamic metaphysical thought.44   
 Sufism is often translated as “mysticism,” but such a word is inadequate, 
particularly for Sufism’s South Asian orders.  Heavily influenced by well-established 
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Vedic ideas, South Asian Sufism is deeply spiritual, and exhorts its followers to seek the 
esoteric (batin) meanings of the Qur’an and Prophetic Hadith.  Monistic ideas such as 
wahdat ul-wujud (“Unity of Existence/Being”) are characteristic of South Asian Sufism.  
However, Ahmad Sirhindi’s seventeenth century reformation re-emphasized Sufism’s 
social activism in addition to its contemplative nature. Iqbal’s religio-philosophical 
outlook also emphasizes deeper understanding of verses’ meaning, and then living them.  
Iqbal’s belief that Islam is defined by one’s actions instead of one’s thinking features 
prominently in his poetry.  
Poetic Works: Shikwa, Jawab-i Shikwa, Asrar-i Khudi   
 Among the first works of poetry Iqbal wrote were in Urdu, the poems Shikwa, 
“The Complaint [Against God],” and Jawab-i Shikwa, “[God’s] Answer to the 
Complaint.”  Both poems were composed shortly after his return to Lahore, and Iqbal 
recited Shikwa and Jawab-i Shikwa in 1910 and 1913 respectively.45  These poems were 
later included in an anthology of his Urdu work called Bang-i Dara (“The Call of the 
Caravan Bell”), published in 1924.46  The theme of Shikwa is a Muslim’s complaint to 
God regarding the colonized status of the Muslims across the world.  In the poem, the 
speaker accuses God of abandoning Muslims despite their adherence to God’s laws: 
 We who with myriad sajdas filled  
 Thy holy Ka’ba’s hallowed shrine 
 Whose bosoms reverently held 
 Thy great and glorious Book Divine—47  
 
This complaint highlights Muslims’ faithful prayers facing Mecca and reverence for the 
Qur’an in spite of God’s failure to reward and protect Muslims.  In Jawab-i Shikwa, God 
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declares such external displays of piety disingenuous.  God reminds Muslims’ of their 
failure to follow the spirit of God’s law, and instead adopting Christian, Hindu, and 
Jewish cultural norms.48  Finally, God tells Muslims to profess real devotion and 
determine their own destinies rather than asking God to meet their needs.49 
 These two powerful works shocked the Muslim community in South Asia.  For a 
human to write a poem accusing God of failure received a negative appraisal.  Yet, Iqbal 
was not exiled, excommunicated, or murdered for his words.  His words struck a nerve, 
but also expressed Muslims collective feelings.  Equally controversial and nearly as 
blasphemous was Iqbal speaking for God in Jawab-i Shikwa.  However, God gives the 
final word, reminding humans of their foibles, and showing humans control their 
destinies, all resonated positively with many listeners.  Ultimately, these two poems 
demonstrate Iqbal’s ability to use poetry to challenge Muslims to change their situation.  
These poems also provide early glimpses into Iqbal’s beliefs about humans, the self, and 
God, and each entity’s relation to the other.  
 The next major work, a Persian poem, was Asrar-i Khudi, usually translated as 
“Secrets of the Self,” published in 1915.50  The complexity of terms Iqbal uses in this 
poem warrants a brief discussion.  Khud and khudi are the Persian terms for “self” in the 
sense of being the sum total of one’s existence.  A useful comparison for understanding 
khud and khudi is the Persian word khodaa, meaning “God,” and comes from the same 
root.  Ruh and nafs are originally Arabic terms, but incorporated into the Persian lexicon.  
                                                 
48
 Id., “The Answer to the Complaint,” in The Call of the Caravan Bell, translated by Altaf Hussain, 193-
98, http://www.allamaiqbal.com/. 
49
 Ibid. 
50
 “Introduction to Secrets of the Self.” The Iqbal Academy Pakistan. http://www.allamaiqbal.com/. 
 - 23 - 
Ruh is the “life-force, spirit” God breathed into Adam to give him life,51 and nafs, in the 
Persianate dualist meaning, is the baser self.  English translations of Iqbal’s uses of 
khud/khudi are “Ego/ego” likely due to his use of those terms in his English works.   
 Within the introduction and the actual text of Asrar-i Khudi, Iqbal explores 
questions concerning human nature, and cites European philosophers in his 
introduction.52  In the poem, Iqbal focuses on the central themes of the Self/Ego, the 
individual, and human nature.53  As a final comment on Iqbal’s works, references will be 
made to poems and other writings not cited as major works to supplement the arguments 
of this thesis.   
Iqbal’s Influences 
 One of his earliest influences was his father, who played a major role in his early 
understanding of Islam.54  Iqbal also believed himself indebted to Mir Hassan Shah for 
his abilities in Arabic, Persian, and Urdu.  Another dramatic influence in his life was Sir 
Thomas Arnold.  Iqbal was Sir Arnold’s favorite pupil, and much of Iqbal’s exposure to 
Christianity came from him.55  Expressing his gratitude, Iqbal dedicated the following 
lines from the poem Nala-e Firaq to Sir Thomas: 
 My frantic hands will unwind the knots of my fate 
 I’ll break the bonds of Punjab, and run to you straight56 
 
Sir Thomas also provided him with greater exposure to and contextual explanation of 
Western European works of philosophy.  Furthermore, Sir Thomas’ status within the field 
                                                 
51
 Qur’an 38:72. 
52
 Muhammad Iqbal, Secrets of the Self, translated by R. A. Nicholson (1920), 3. 1915. 
http://www.allamaiqbal.com/. 
53
 Ibid. 
54
 “Biography of Allama Iqbal.” The Iqbal Academy Pakistan.  
55
 Hafeez Malik (Professor of Political Science, Villanova University), in discussion with author, April 
2008. 
56
 Kanda, Selected Poetry, 3. 
 - 24 - 
of Islamic Studies, and respect for Islam, would have made him even more influential to 
Iqbal.  Finally, as a part of Iqbal’s formative academic years, he gave Iqbal the necessary 
respect for Western European progress evident in his syncretic religious philosophy.   
 The next great influence on Iqbal’s thought was Friedrich Nietzsche.  Although 
the two never met, Iqbal encountered Nietzsche through his books.  There are fifteen 
explicit mentions, both positive and negative, of Nietzsche within his poetry and The 
Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam.  Despite some of Iqbal’s reservations 
regarding Nietzsche’s religious philosophy, he had great admiration for Nietzsche’s 
belief in the power of the individual spirit. 
Iqbal’s European Philosophical Influences   
 In Europe, Iqbal was exposed to the emerging differences between British 
philosophy and European continental philosophy.  Particularly in the United Kingdom, 
but with a modest following in Germany, was a growing belief that philosophy should 
restrict itself to precise use of language.  Termed Analytic Philosophy, it was based on 
the idea that language is finite and restricts the expression of ideas.  Rather than focusing 
on metaphysics, the new goal was to improve the logic of existing arguments through 
greater linguistic precision.  This had the effect of changing philosophy into a structured 
field valuing logical and linguistic analysis of arguments over creativity of thought.   
 The counterbalance to this increasingly narrow view was “Continental 
Philosophy,” prominent in France and Germany.  This philosophical position was 
empirical, focusing on phenomena.  Continental philosophers discussed the individual’s 
existence as occurring within sequences of phenomena, considering “being” not as an 
end, but a process.  It was in these philosophical climates that Iqbal found himself in the 
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early twentieth century studying philosophy under J. M. E. McTaggart in the United 
Kingdom and under Dr. Friedrich Hommel in Germany.  McTaggart was an expert in 
Hegelian philosophy, and gave Iqbal a firm grounding in Hegelian phenomenology.  Dr. 
Hommel, on the other hand, was not a philosopher, but a German Orientalist specializing 
in Cuneiform, Assyrian history, and general ancient Near East history.  Under Dr. 
Hommel’s supervision, Iqbal wrote his doctoral dissertation on the historical 
development of Persian metaphysics.57  Additionally, Iqbal studied in Germany shortly 
after Nietzsche’s death, and observed the heated debate surrounding Nietzsche.58  It is 
likely at this time that Iqbal read Nietzsche, despite possible warnings from Dr. Hommel, 
a committed Christian.59   
 Apart from Nietzsche, the ideas of Whitehead and Bergson influenced Iqbal’s 
religious philosophy.  Although not published at the time of Iqbal’s European education, 
Whitehead’s Process and Reality (1929) impacted Iqbal’s conception of time, 
demonstrated by Iqbal’s multiple references to Whitehead in The Reconstruction of 
Religious Thought in Islam.  Bergson’s Creative Evolution (French 1907, English 1910) 
also influenced Iqbal’s thought, despite his disagreements with Bergson’s conception of 
time,60 which Iqbal characterized as incompatible with a Qur’anic worldview.   
 Although occasionally disagreeing with Whitehead in his lectures as well, it is 
clear that Iqbal likes Whitehead’s idea of time as a duality.  Whitehead describes time as 
both creative duration driven by individual action, and the discrete units required by 
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human thought to comprehend events.61  Iqbal agrees in particular with Whitehead’s 
Qur’anic understanding of the universe saying, “…Professor Whitehead describes the 
universe, not as something static, but as a structure of events possessing the character of a 
continuous creative flow.”  
 Evaluating the relationship between Iqbal’s influences and his thought is a 
difficult task.  His religious philosophy was original and unique, but clearly drew upon 
philosophies he studied.  Iqbal is most grateful toward his father, Mir Hassan Shah, Sir 
Thomas, Whitehead and Bergson.  However, it is difficult to say if Iqbal had a positive or 
negative appraisal of Nietzsche.  Most of Iqbal’s poetic references to Nietzsche convey a 
sense of pity, but The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam draws heavily upon 
Nietzsche’s ideas of self-empowerment.  Iqbal’s appraisal of Nietzsche is a critical 
question surrounding his fascination with Nietzsche, and will be covered in more detail in 
a later chapter.   
 The fingerprints of other European philosophers like McTaggart, Whitehead, and 
Bergson can also be seen in The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam.  
Specifically, these thinkers contributed to Iqbal’s understanding of time, space, and 
creativity’s role in human existence.  These ideas were important when Iqbal read 
Nietzsche, as they influenced him both toward and away from Nietzsche.  
 
Iqbal’s Political Context 
 Understanding the thrust of Iqbal's thought requires appreciating his colonial 
context.  Britain had maintained an imperial presence in the Indian subcontinent since the 
founding of the East India Company in 1600.  After crushing the Great Mutiny of 1857, 
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Britain held political, economic, and military hegemony until 1947, when it divided the 
subcontinent into India and East and West Pakistan.  As a member of the cultural elite, 
Iqbal benefited from access to British schools with Western curricula, and opportunities 
to study in Europe.  However, the overall impact of colonialism in the subcontinent was 
negative and his disdain is captured in his lines about the Jallianwala Massacre in 1919: 
 Thus says the garden dust to the pilgrims of the park, 
 About the tricks of heaven remain thee not in the dark; 
 The seed of this tree was fed on the martyrs’ blood, 
 Wash it with your tears, flush it root and bark.62  
 
In this socio-political climate, Iqbal expressed admiration for Western European 
achievements, and aversion to actions carried out in the name of empire-building.   
Iqbal’s Intellectual Context  
 Iqbal’s South Asian intellectual context was characterized by a pan-Islamic 
reform movement led by figures such as Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan (d. 1898), Ameer Ali 
Sayed (d. 1928), and Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (d. 1897).63  Each of these individuals 
advocated intellectual, educational, social, and political renewal through the use of 
ijtihad, the mechanism whereby scholars revise Islamic law in accordance with changing 
circumstances. These figures contended that ijtihad was required for Muslim societies to 
resist colonialism and adapt to Europe’s technological advances.  Their opponents 
maintained the absolute sufficiency of traditional formulations of Islamic law, and that 
Muslims should not be involved in secular affairs.     
 Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan’s ideas focused on the compatibility of science and 
Islam.  He argued that Muslims were being colonized because of social weakness caused 
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by a lack of modern education.64  This prompted him to establish the Mohammadan 
Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh in 1875, which provided an English-medium 
education in modern disciplines to build an educated class of Indian Muslims.65   
 Ameer Ali Sayed's Spirit of Islam emphasized Islam’s spiritual principles rather 
than strict jurisprudence, believing Islam was more than a legal code.66  This view 
motivated him to found the All-India Muslim League in London in 1908 to promote his 
political vision regarding Islam, viewing enlightened Islamic rule as the best possible 
form of governance.67  Ameer Ali’s emphasis on Islam’s underlying spiritual principles, 
influenced Iqbal to see what supported law, and uncover the underlying moral principles.  
 Finally, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani’s Salafism greatly shaped Iqbal’s religious 
context.  Al-Afghani’s seminal work was Answer of Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani to Renan 
(original in French, Réponse de Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani à Renan) to French Orientalist 
Ernst Renan, critiquing his lecture and article L’islam et la science (Islam and Science), 
in which Renan argued that Islam and Semites (i.e. Arabs) were incapable of scientific 
reasoning.68  In response to attacks such as this, al-Afghani also advocated the 
compatibility of Islam and modernity, and encouraging pan-Muslim unity under Islam.  
Afghani is credited with founding the Salafi movement, which advocated imitation of 
early Muslims’ piety and decision-making methodology to adapt to changing 
circumstances. 
 Also important to Iqbal’s intellectual context was the religious reform and 
liberation movement among Hindus led primarily by Mohandas Gandhi.  Although not 
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the subject of this thesis, the comparison to Gandhi is helpful due to greater scholarly and 
non-scholarly familiarity with Gandhi’s movement.  Gandhi, like Iqbal, was educated in 
the British colonial system, and also anti-colonial.  Also similar to Iqbal, Gandhi used 
religious language to rally and empower Hindu Indians around independence from 
Britain.  Although the term is not exactly applicable to Gandhi, Faisal Devji links 
Gandhi’s non-violent movement based on ethics with contemporary global jihad 
movements.69  Admitting the “grotesque” comparison, he indulges it insofar as jihad is, 
depending on perspective, a struggle to make a situation more just.  In this way, Devji 
likens Gandhi and Iqbal’s movements as intellectual precursors to contemporary “ethical” 
jihad.70    
Summary 
 The previous discussion of Iqbal’s life, major works, and influences 
contextualizes his ideas.  Given the intellectual base available to him, one may question 
his originality.  However, Iqbal drew upon the existing knowledge base when he began 
codifying his religious and philosophical ideas.  Yet, he also added a new, Islamic 
religious philosophy to the intellectual heritage of South Asia.  Such a reciprocal 
relationship between Iqbal and his context makes it difficult to separate original and 
influenced ideas.  The responsible, and correct, approach to understanding his ideas is to 
acknowledge reciprocity between the individual and the environment.  
 
Islam as the Religion of Individual Empowerment 
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 One of the central themes in Iqbal’s religious philosophy, and related to 
Nietzsche’s, is Islam as a religion of individual empowerment.  This idea can be 
understood as an ability to make moral decisions without coercion from external sources.  
It can also refer to an individual’s ability to form a moral or philosophical code free from 
coercion.  Iqbal’s view of individual empowerment is the idea that through Islam, and 
Sufism, one acquires God’s attributes and unlocks and fulfills one’s creative potential.71   
 The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam 
 Iqbal states in his preface, “The Qur’an is a book which emphasizes ‘deed’ rather 
than ‘idea’.”72  This remark sets the tone for his entire discussion of Islamic reform in 
light of modern scientific discovery and the threat of materialism.  The Qur’an’s purpose, 
and thus Islam’s, is to “awaken in man the higher consciousness of his manifold relations 
with God and the universe.”73  More generally, religion’s purpose is “the transformation 
and guidance of man’s inner and outer life.”74  Despite these inducements to action and 
change, Iqbal describes the Muslim world as intellectually stagnant, and spiritually 
moving toward “the West.”  This spiritual trend refers to increasing materialism, which is 
not necessarily negative.  However, he fears for the loss of Muslims’ cultural heritage as 
Muslims gaze at Europe’s wonders, and fail to recognize the Islamic principles 
underlying these achievements.75  The aim of his lectures is: 
 … to examine, in an independent spirit, what Europe has thought and how far the conclusions 
reached by  her can help us in the revision and, if necessary, reconstruction, of theological thought in 
Islam.76 
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In his closing chapter, “Is Religion Possible?” he extols Islam’s creative spirit, and 
challenges Muslims to view taqdir (“destiny”) as a series of internal potentials attainable 
through individual effort.77  Iqbal emphasizes a “mature Fatalism” as:  
 …not negation of the ego… it is life and boundless power which recognizes no obstruction, and 
can make  a man calmly offer his prayers when bullets are showering around him.78 
 
And he re-emphasizes his belief that the Qur’an focuses on action over idea: 
 The ultimate aim of the ego is not to see something, but to be something. It is in the ego’s effort to 
be  something that he discovers his final opportunity to sharpen his objectivity and acquire a more 
fundamental  ‘I am’ which finds evidence of its reality not in the Cartesian ‘I think’ but in the Kantian 
‘I can.’ The end  of the ego’s quest is not emancipation from the limitations of individuality; it is, on the 
other hand, a more  precise definition of it.  … The world is not something to be merely seen or 
known through concepts, but  something to be made and re-made by continuous action.79  
 
 The guiding purpose behind the lectures is to encourage Muslims to adapt to 
changing times and information.  The purpose is not to change Islam in light of twentieth 
century discoveries and values, but to use the new knowledge to inform one’s view of 
Islam.  The religion remains the same, but how one understands it is what Iqbal proposes 
to change.   
 Iqbal believes self-empowerment comes through religion, which he describes as 
both rational and non-rational.  The believer’s emotions and feelings within the 
experience of religion are more important than religious knowledge because emotions 
and feelings drive action.  In fact, Iqbal argues for a balance between spirit and intellect:  
 The idea of finality, therefore, should not be taken to suggest that the ultimate fate of life is 
complete  displacement of emotion by reason. Such a thing is neither possible nor desirable. The 
intellectual value of  the idea is that it tends to create an independent critical attitude towards mystic 
experience by generating  the belief that all personal authority, claiming a supernatural origin, has come to 
an end in the history of  man. This kind of belief is a psychological force which inhibits the growth of 
such authority.80   
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 Exactly how religion is a source of individual empowerment also requires 
discussion.  Western European religio-philosophical tradition tends to promote the idea 
that individual freedom is antithetical to the moral restraints demanded by religion.  Iqbal 
disagrees.  Central to his argument is what he calls a “Higher Fatalism.”81  According to 
Iqbal, religious maturity is a progression through three stages of development, and 
through this three stage progression:  
 …religion becomes a matter of personal assimilation of life and power; and the individual 
achieves a free  personality, not by releasing himself from the fetters of the law, but by discovering the 
ultimate source of  the law within the depths of his own consciousness.82 
 
Empowerment comes through a deeper understanding of oneself by gaining a deeper 
understanding of the wisdom contained in religion.  Iqbal further states: 
 …higher religion, which is only a search for a larger life, is essentially experience and recognized 
the  necessity of experience as its foundation long before science learnt to do so. It is a genuine effort 
to clarify  human consciousness, and is, as such, as critical of its level of experience as Naturalism 
is of its own  level.83  
 
 Religion, which is essentially a mode of actual living, is the only serious way of handling  Reality. 
As a  form of higher experience it is corrective of our concepts of philosophical theology or at least 
makes us  suspicious of the purely rational process which forms these concepts. Science can afford 
to ignore  metaphysics altogether, and may even believe it to be ‘a justified form of poetry’, as 
Lange defined it, or ‘a  legitimate play of grown-ups’, as Nietzsche described it. But the religious expert 
who seeks to discover his  personal status in the constitution of things cannot, in view of the final aim of 
his struggle, be satisfied with  what science may regard as a vital lie, a mere ‘as-if’ to regulate thought 
and conduct. In so far as the  ultimate nature of Reality is concerned, nothing is at stake in the 
venture of science; in the religious venture  the whole career of the ego as an assimilative personal centre 
of life and experience is at stake.84    
 
Religion is neither a crutch nor a moral dogma, but a way of discovering oneself, one’s 
purpose, and creating one’s destiny.   
 As a Muslim, Iqbal believes religion’s liberating power is best experienced in 
Islam.  This belief is evident in his comparisons of Islam to Judaism, Christianity, 
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Buddhism, and Hinduism (Vedic religions).  The only real references to Judaism 
emphasize Judaism’s historical role in providing a reason for Christianity’s revolt.85  He 
contrasts Judaism as a religion of legality with Christianity as a religion of spirituality.86  
Given his education background with Christian missionaries, Iqbal has more to say about 
Christianity.  He describes Christianity’s focus as spiritual, and not temporal.87  He cites 
Friedrich Naumann (Briefe über Religion), to describe Christianity’s ideal social and 
political disinterest in worldly affairs.88  Iqbal’s thoughts on Buddhism are expressed in 
Islam as a Moral and Political Ideal (1909), where he says Buddhism’s emphasis on pain 
leads to otherworldliness and inaction.89  Iqbal’s view of Hinduism is not positive either.  
To Iqbal, Hinduism is a caste-based religion inferior to Islam’s egalitarianism.  Given 
these comparisons, Iqbal believes Islam is a religion of empowerment because it does not 
adhere to strict legality (Judaism), require redemption (Christianity), believe in pain’s 
inevitability (Buddhism), or promote a hierarchy (Hinduism).  In Islam:  
 Man is a free and responsible being; he is the maker of his own destiny; his salvation is his own 
business.   There is no mediator between God and man.  God is the birthright of every man.90 
 
Islam’s freedom and agency are what make it the most suitable religion for individual 
empowerment.   
 Asrar-i Khudi   
 Iqbal extols individualism as the highest virtue of existence when he quotes the 
Prophet saying, “Takhallaqu bi-akhlaq Allah,” meaning “Create [within yourselves] the 
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attributes of God.”91  According to Iqbal, the entire purpose of life is to become more 
unique by becoming more like God.  The overall theme of the poem is an exploration of 
the Self.  Early in the poem, Iqbal brings to light a paradox stating, “Self-affirmation 
brings not-self to light.”  As important as creating new attributes for the Self is, it is 
equally important to understand what the Self is not.  Iqbal then broaches the subject of 
love, and describes how love is both an action and a feeling, and the ideal of 
individualism.92  Iqbal then differentiates between asking others for help and self-
reliance, favoring self-reliance.93  Finally, Iqbal discusses the three phases a believer 
must pass through on the path toward individualism and fulfillment of the Self, which 
will be discussed later.94   
 Iqbal’s purpose behind Asrar-i Khudi, is found in the section entitled, “An 
invocation”.95  Here, Iqbal encourages all Muslims to seek life by being as unique as 
possible.  By seeking individuality, Muslims will inspire each other to further seek God 
and reach a state of perfection.  Reinforcing this point are Iqbal’s statements regarding 
the purpose of life:  
 The ultimate end of all human activity is Life—glorious, powerful, exuberant. All human  art must 
be  subordinated to this final purpose, and the value of everything must be  determined in reference to 
its life- yielding capacity.  The highest art is that which awakens our dormant will-force and braves us to 
face the  trials of life manfully.  All that brings drowsiness and makes us shut our eyes to reality around, on 
the  mastery of which  alone Life depends, is a message of decay and death. There should be no opium-
eating in  Art.  The dogma of Art for the sake of Art is a clever invention of decadence to cheat us 
out of life and  power.96 
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Iqbal’s work of poetry is no exception.  His ultimate purpose is to awaken in South Asian 
Muslims the desire to seek the individualism of God and thereby empower themselves 
through their religion. 
 Shikwa and Jawab-i Shikwa 
 The central crux of Shikwa (1910) revolves around the speaker’s prayer to God in 
the form of a complaint.  The speaker both asks and demands of God an answer for the 
current situation of Muslims in South Asia, and identifies God as the target of his 
accusation: 
 For I too have the gift of song 
 Which gives me courage to complain, 
 But ah! ‘tis none but God Himself 
 Whom I, in sorrow, must arraign!97  
 
The speaker is both confrontational and reverent, suggesting Iqbal knew how close he 
was to blasphemy in the eyes of some Muslims.  More than a rant, the poem is a 
philosophical question on the nature of evil.  How could a good God allow such things to 
happen to believers?  The complainer addresses the fact that Muslims have successfully 
spread God’s message throughout the world, and yet, Muslims are colonized.  The 
complainer also discusses Muslims’ spiritual struggle stating: 
 Did we foreswear our faith to Thee? 
 To Thy dear Prophet cease to cling? 
 Of idol-breaking did we tire? 
 Or take to idol-worshipping? 
  Or did we weary of Thy Love, 
  Or Thy Love’s rapture ever shun?98  
 
The complainer asks God why Muslims are suffering under foreign oppression when they 
have remained faithful to God.  The poem ends by beseeching and reminding God to 
bless believers and uphold God’s contractual obligation.   
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 Careful analysis reveals Iqbal is ridiculing many of his co-religionists.  If this 
poem is indicative of Muslims’ sentiments, then religious contractualism was a prominent 
theological view.  Although extolling Muslims’ actions throughout history, it is clear that 
the complainer’s faith lacks maturity.  The poem’s target audience was South Asian 
Muslims, and its purpose was to both give expression to their grievances and cast light on 
their immature faith.   
 Jawab-i Shikwa 
 Iqbal’s 1913 Jawab-i Shikwa was another iconoclastic way of expressing his 
overall theology.  Speaking as God, Iqbal responds to the complainer by mocking the 
complainer:   
 So great their insolence indeed, 
 They dare even God upbraid!99  
 
Not responding to complaint line by line, God instead addresses South Asian Muslim 
behavior at large.  God begins by criticizing the attitude with which Muslims perform 
their spiritual duties such as prayer and fasting.  Next, God attacks Muslims’ failure to 
keep pace with advances in knowledge, and the expectation that God will provide.100  
Furthermore, God criticizes Muslims for trying to adopt the religious and cultural 
practices around them: 
 From Christians you have learnt your style 
 Your culture from the Hindus; 
 How can a race of Muslims pass 
 Who shame even the Jews? 
 
 You are known as Syed, and Mughal, 
 You call yourselves Pathan; 
 But can you truly claim as well 
 The name of Mussalman?101  
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Ending the diatribe, God reminds Muslims that they must rid themselves of colonial 
humiliation and seize their destiny: 
 Thy shield be wisdom, be thy sword 
 The flaming Love Divine, 
 My fond dervish! dost thou not know 
 That all the world is thine? 
  All else but God is at thy feet, 
  If sounds thy Takbeer great; 
  If thou a Muslim truly art, 
  Thy effort is thy fate. 
 To my Muhammad be but true, 
 And thou hast conquered me; 
 The world is nought: thou shalt command  
 My Pen of Destiny.102  
 
The message to South Asian Muslims is clear: do not rest on your laurels.  “Thy effort is 
thy fate” means that what Muslims will receive only rewards for which they strive.103   
 
 
Iqbal’s Specific Ideas 
 In addition to individual empowerment, other important religio-philosophical 
ideas exist within Iqbal’s works.  These ideas are: insan-i kamil, Heaven and Hell, 
religion, Islam, and morality.  Each of these ideas deserves greater attention, and will be 
analyzed using primarily The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, selected 
analysis by Hafeez Malik, and other works where appropriate.   
 Insan-i Kamil 
 The idea of insan-i kamil, often “The Perfect Man,” but also translated “The 
Perfect Human,” is Iqbal’s exemplar Muslim; a perfectly free and empowered individual.  
Although featured prominently in Iqbal’s religious philosophy, it is not original to Iqbal.  
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Furthermore, it is not a concept Iqbal explicitly discusses in any of his major writings 
except for Zubur-i ‘Ajam (Persian Psalms): 
 Question 7 
 Of what sort is this traveler, who is this wayfarer? 
 Of whom shall I say that he is the Perfect Man?104 
  
In 62 lines, Iqbal does not describe in great detail the attributes of the “Perfect Man,” but 
describes a human who is both a master of religion and matters of state.105   
 According to Badaiyuni, a scholar at the Iqbal Academy in Pakistan, the idea of 
insan-i kamil originated with Sufi thinker al-Jili, who originally used the term to describe 
the Prophet Muhammad.106  Iqbal acquired this idea from his studies in Sufism, 
expounded upon the concept, and removed the exclusivity reserved for the Prophet 
Muhammad.  Iqbal’s version of the insan-i kamil has distinct attributes that any 
individual can cultivate.    
 The defining characteristic of the insan-i kamil is its successful completion of 
three stages of religious development: Faith/Obedience to Law, Thought/Self-Control, 
Discovery/Vice-Regent of God.107  In the first stage, a Muslim submits to the will of God 
emphasizing the insan-i kamil’s bravery, devotion, and reverence for the ideal that is 
insan-i kamil.108  During the second stage, a Muslim destroys his/her reverence for 
decadent values, and maintains a reverence for the insan-i kamil.  This stage emphasizes 
the determination within the individual Muslim to strive for the ideal of the Perfect 
Human.  However, an individual cannot remain in such a stage of destruction, and must 
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revere something.  In the final stage, a Muslim creates new values from his or her 
struggle toward the ideal of insan-i kamil and God’s will.  Through the creation of life 
affirming values, the individual gains a deeper understanding of the self.  This striving for 
a creative, self-oriented ego is the purpose of a Muslim’s life, and is exemplified by the 
Prophet Muhammad.  This final stage emphasizes the most important aspect of the insan-
i kamil, creativity.  Through these three phases, a Muslim transforms from a believer to 
the insan-i kamil, a true khalifa, or Vice-Regent, of God on earth possessing 
characteristics of deep reverence, destructive strength, and creative power.109 
 Given these stringent criteria, it is natural to wonder if any individuals other than 
the Prophet have achieved the high spirituality of insan-i kamil.  In his writings, Iqbal 
fails to mention any other human examples.  However, he does not claim it is 
unattainable, and perhaps thought himself an insan-i kamil.  Another question stemming 
from Iqbal’s idea of the insan-i kamil is the purpose of such an individual.  The purpose 
of this individual is to guide society toward perfection, and use his/her power to help 
others achieve perfection.110   
 Heaven and Hell 
 Among Iqbal’s more curious ideas are his views on Heaven and Hell.  Iqbal 
plainly states in The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, “Heaven and Hell are 
states, not localities.  Their descriptions in the Qur’an are visual representations of an 
inner fact, i.e. character.”111  This is consistent with his other metaphorical, Sufi 
interpretations of Qur’anic verses.  Hell “in the words of the Qur’an, is ‘God’s kindled 
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fire which mounts above the hearts’—the painful realization of one’s failure as a man.”  
In contrast, Heaven “is the joy of triumph over the forces of disintegration.”  Discussing 
the subject of time and eternity, Iqbal rebuffs the idea that Hell is permanent.  Rather than 
“eternal damnation,” it is “a corrective experience which may make a hardened ego once 
more sensitive to the breeze of Divine Grace”.112  Furthermore:  
 Nor is Heaven a holiday.  Life is one and continuous.  Man marches always onward to receive 
ever fresh  illuminations from an Infinite Reality which ‘every moment appears in  a new glory.’  
And the recipient of  Divine Illumination is not merely a passive recipient.  Every act of a free ego 
creates a new situation, and  thus offers further opportunities for creative unfolding.113  
 
 Heaven and Hell are not fixed states, but dynamic and building character.  By 
rejecting any permanence to Hell, Iqbal implies that all humans eventually reach Heaven, 
and ultimately creative, free egos. 
 Religion 
 In defining religion, Iqbal states: 
 Apart from this, religion on its doctrinal side, as defined by Professor Whitehead, is ‘a system of 
general  truths which have the effect of transforming character when they are sincerely held and vividly 
 apprehended.’114  
 
The “this” Iqbal refers to, is faith, and is essential to religion.  The idea of transformation 
also features prominently because it is consonant with his goal of transforming the 
individual into the insan-i kamil.  However, an important consideration is Iqbal’s 
understanding of religion versus the public’s conception of religion at the time.  Iqbal’s 
definition clashes with the contractual nature of religion as an agreement between 
believer and God, expressed at length in Shikwa.  Iqbal criticizes contractualism using the 
Mu‘tazilite theological school as an example: 
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 The Mu‘tazilah, conceiving religion merely as a body of doctrines and ignoring it as a vital fact, 
took no  notice of non-conceptual modes of approaching Reality and reduced religion to a mere system of 
logical  concepts ending in a purely negative attitude.115  
 
Iqbal’s transformative conception challenged the public’s contractualism.  However, it is 
important to remember that Iqbal was a member, and a product of this society, and surely 
shared some ideas concerning religion with his fellow South Asian Muslims.  Taking his 
definition of religion with his other statements, it is clear he believes religion is a positive 
force for changing individuals and societies.116   
 The purpose of religion, according to Iqbal, is “the transformation and guidance 
of man’s inner and outer life.”117  This leaves one wondering if religion is purely 
functional or has substantive elements.  Iqbal answers this question by declaring religion 
both a force and method to aid humans in understanding their universe through the tools 
of thought and intuition:  
 Religion is not a departmental affair; it is neither mere thought, nor mere feeling, nor mere action; 
it is an  expression of the whole man… Nor is there any reason to suppose that thought and intuition are 
essentially  opposed to each other. They spring up from the same root and complement each other. 
The one grasps  Reality piecemeal, the other grasps it in its wholeness… Both seek visions of the same 
Reality which  reveals itself to them in accordance with their function in life.118  
 
 Finally, understanding religion’s source is crucial to knowing how humans can 
perceive their universe.  His attack on evolutionary theories of religion makes clear his 
belief that religion is not purely a human construct, although he states some religions are 
forms of escapism.119  He also criticizes Jung’s view of religion as a “kind of well-
meaning biological device” warning that this view of religion sends people “in an entirely 
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hopeless direction.”120  The ultimate source of religion, according to Iqbal, is the very 
thing it seeks, the Ultimate Reality.  Religion is a “representative of some kind of 
Reality,” and guides humans back to its source.  While Iqbal hates to use the term 
Mysticism, religion is a mystical way of knowing the universe and humans’ purpose of 
achieving the perfection God designed for them.121   
 In summary, Iqbal’s view of religion is a unique way of perceiving the universe.  
Mere understanding requires only philosophy.  However, Iqbal believes that religion and 
life are dynamic processes continually seeking God and human perfection.  Religion 
encapsulates all of human existence, and is critical to holistically understanding human 
existence and purpose.  Islam fits into his conception of religion perfectly because Islam 
is a wholly encapsulating system uniting “religion and state, ethics and politics in a single 
revelation.”122   
 Islam 
 Few actual descriptions of Islam are found in The Reconstruction of Religious 
Thought in Islam, perhaps due to the origin of the work as a lecture.  However, in the 
poem Rumuz-i Bekhudi (The Mysteries of Selflessness), Iqbal has an entire section 
entitled “The Pillars of Islam.”  Instead of a description of Islam, it is an analysis of 
tawhid, “the unity and oneness of God,” and apostleship in Islam.123  These two concepts 
are important aspects of the unified, universal Islam Iqbal seeks.  Tawhid is a source of 
confidence that alleviates fear and all negative emotions that hinder a Muslim, and in The 
Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, Iqbal describes tawhid as “equality, 
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solidarity, and freedom.”124  Iqbal believes that the belief in a singular, unique God leads 
one to believe in individualism, and reflect the individualism of God (tawhid) in 
oneself.125  Iqbal further applies this idea to the community and all humans in Bang-i 
Dara: 
 This is the destiny of nature; this is the secret of Islam— 
 World-wide brotherhood, an abundance of love! 
 Break the idols of colour and blood and 
 become lost in the community. 
 Let neither Turanians, Iranians nor Afghans remain.126   
 
Iqbal’s vision of Islam is the unity of all believers lived on an individual and community 
level. 
 Perhaps paradoxically, Iqbal’s Islam is active, not intellectual, driven by the 
purposes of empowering the self, community, and political liberation.  Clarifying his 
point, Iqbal separates intellectualism from “vitalism,” labeling intellectualism as mere 
understandings of causality.  Vitalism, on the other hand, is Iqbal’s “Higher Fatalism” 
and equivalent to the term, iman (“belief”).  Rather than intellectual belief, iman is lived 
through one’s actions: “Iman is not merely a passive belief in one or more propositions of 
a certain kind; it is a living assurance begotten of a rare experience.”127   
 Iqbal credits Islam’s action-orientation to the Prophet Muhammad, and calls him 
the first religious rationalist, psychologist, and pragmatist.  To support his statements, 
Iqbal cites Prophetic Hadith (statements and deeds of the Prophet).  Iqbal stresses 
Muhammad’s virtues as evidence for his being an insan-i kamil, particularly highlighting 
his ego’s creative energy.128   
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 A final point is Iqbal’s acknowledgment of multiple Islams.  Although he is a 
proponent of his Islam, which he believes to be the true kind, he displays an awareness of 
other interpretations.  In Zarb-i Kalim (The Rod of Moses) he states: 
 Go and recite in some cool grot 
  Your paternoster— 
 And there concoct some new Islam, 
  Whose mystic kernel 
 Shall be a tame submissive calm, 
  Despair eternal!129  
 
This acknowledgement of different Islams demonstrates two important points about his 
religious philosophy.  The first is that he knew his audience, and was aware of the 
difference between textual Islam and practiced Islam.  The second point is his recognition 
that his individually empowering Islam would have to overcome the established Islam.  
This second point caused Iqbal no small amount of distress as the possibility of his 
empowering Islam not taking hold occurred to him: 
 Iqbal! No-one in this world has ever known 
 your secret. 
 Does anyone know the pain I feel inside me?130  
  
 Morality  
 
 According to Iqbal’s writings, morality is an unwavering code of conduct that 
allows free egos to achieve their full potential.131  Applying definition by negation, one 
can also understand what Iqbal means by morality by understanding what it is not.  
Morality is neither utilitarian, nor is it predetermined.132  It is a fixed system of behavior, 
in which right and wrong, good and evil do exist.  Iqbal chooses this behavioral definition 
because morality functions as a code of conduct for free egos, allowing them to unlock 
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their potential.  Iqbal is emphatically a moral absolutist.  Supporting this claim is a 
reference from The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam where he discusses the 
principle of ijtihad (legal exertion to derive moral law): 
 The only alternative open to us, then, is to tear off from Islam the hard crust which has 
immobilized an  essentially dynamic outlook on life, and to rediscover the original verities of freedom, 
equality, and  solidarity with a view to rebuild our moral, social, and political ideals out of their original 
simplicity and  universality.133  
 
His moral absolutism is also based on his belief in the principle of tawhid.  Morality does 
not change—only the understandings of law informing moral behavior change.  These 
changing understandings of how to be moral apply to all humans irrespective of religion 
or creed.  The question, then, is what is Iqbal’s source of morality?  Examining Iqbal’s 
statements, he equates Shari‘a (Divine Law) and morality, and fiqh (human interpreted 
law) must change as insights into Shari‘a change.  Thus, what is legal, either known 
through Shari‘a or fiqh at the time is moral.  The sources of morality, then, are the 
sources of law, or the usul al-fiqh: The Qur’an, the Hadith, Scholarly Consensus (ijma‘), 
and Qiyas (syllogistic reasoning), and/or Ijtihad for changing contexts.134  The first two 
sources are commonly accepted as sources for Shari‘a whereas the latter two are 
considered sources for fiqh.   
 In terms of providing examples of morality, Iqbal is quiet.  However, he is vocal 
about determining the ultimate morality of actions.  Iqbal’s rationalization of morality 
hinges on the fixed principles of Shari‘a which humans understand better over time.  
Therefore, good actions in the sixteenth century may not be considered good in the 
twentieth century because how to achieve the same good has evolved.135   
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 Iqbal’s overall philosophy is about holistic understanding of events, and includes 
good and evil.  Iqbal states, “Good and evil, therefore, though opposites, must fall within 
the same whole.”136  “There is no such thing as an isolated fact; for facts are systematic 
wholes the elements of which must be understood by mutual reference.”137  Good and 
evil have absolute standards, and humans must continually strive for the moral good to 
free their egos, but categorical separation of actions is impossible because good and evil 
are symbiotic.  
 Addressing a core Islamic belief regarding God’s judgment, Iqbal injects intent as 
another factor in determining the morality or immorality of actions.  “It is the invisible 
mental background of an act that ultimately determines its character.”138  In sum, moral 
and immoral actions are based on the current contextual understanding of Shari‘a, the 
impact of an ego’s free choice on others and its quest for freedom, and the action’s intent.  
If an action was committed “in the spirit of detachment from the infinite complexity of 
life behind it,”139 it is profane and immoral.  However, the ultimate judge of such is not 
human, but divine, a fact Iqbal readily admits, “… God best knoweth what ye do! He will 
judge between you on the Day of Resurrection…”140  
 Finally, morality’s intersection with Islam is simple—being truly moral means 
building moral power through moral choice.  This pursuit of moral power to achieve a 
state of freedom is the same goal as Islam.  Morality and Islam therefore intersect in that 
they are one in the same.  What is moral is Islam, and what is Islam is moral.   
Conclusion 
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 Iqbal was a rare figure with a rarer religious philosophy.  He radically altered how 
many Muslims understood religion, and contributed to the Muslim efforts to end British 
colonization in South Asia.  He came from a unique family, and his diverse educational 
background exposed him to many different modes of thinking.  All of this culminated in 
his poetic works, which express a desire for self-determination for Muslims, and a desire 
to unlock humans’ potential.  To Iqbal, there is no limit to human achievement if given 
the proper guidance, which naturally comes from God, the Qur’an, the Prophet 
Muhammad, and Islam.   
 An important point when reading Iqbal’s religious philosophy is his pragmatism.  
He alters his tone and emphasizes different points as a function of context.  He was 
highly emotional concerning colonization, and quite an activist, joining many Muslim 
societies involved in subcontinent politics.  Iqbal’s functionalism is geared toward freeing 
the individual and collective egos of Muslims.  However, Iqbal does not see secular 
pursuits as the best means to liberation, and instead sees religion, and ultimately Islam, as 
a unifying factor to help Muslims end colonization.  This need for an empowering 
religious philosophy is part of the reason he developed such a religious philosophy.  Yet, 
his religious philosophy was dynamic and capable of lasting beyond liberation contexts.  
Iqbal was a visionary who advocated new ways of viewing the self, religion, Islam, and 
human existence, and attempted to gain followers willing to carry out his ideas.  
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Chapter 2: Nietzsche’s Thought and Philosophy 
 
 One of the most admired and hated philosophers, in both his time and 
posthumously, Nietzsche has been the victim of polemics and apologetics.  In discussing 
his background and religious philosophy, this thesis seeks to provide the reader with the 
basic information necessary to understand Nietzsche in order to follow the thesis’s 
argument that linkages between Nietzsche and Iqbal exist.  This thesis does not seek to 
condemn or enshrine Nietzsche, but merely to describe and explain, where necessary, 
contextual information that allows a reader to make his or her own judgments regarding 
Nietzsche’s religious philosophy and its relationship to Iqbal’s religious philosophy.  This 
requires a focus on the major themes of his religious philosophy with necessary 
background and supplemental information provided for comprehension.  It should be 
noted that the general interpretation of Nietzsche given in this chapter is one of nuance 
and subtlety.  Rarely will Nietzsche be taken at face value, and underlying meanings and 
cross-references will be used to explain various religio-philosophical positions.  The 
reading of Nietzsche offered in this chapter is not radical, but sees Nietzsche’s works as 
part of a continuous discussion of identifiable main themes. 
 Nietzsche was born on October 15, 1844 in Röcken, Saxony, Prussia, into a very 
religious household.  His father, Ludwig Nietzsche, was a Lutheran pastor of the Pietism 
movement and his mother, Franziska Oehler was the daughter of a Lutheran pastor. The 
Lutheran Pietism movement was an emotional and experiential movement, which had a 
deep impact on Nietzsche’s thoughts on intellectualism.1  In 1864, Nietzsche enrolled in 
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the University of Bonn where he studied theology and majored in classical philology.2  
Several years later, in 1869, Nietzsche was conferred a doctorate by the University of 
Leipzig and accepted a teaching position of classical philology at the University of Basel 
which he retained until 1879.3  Nietzsche also had brief stints in military service, first in 
1867 and again in 1870 during the Franco-Prussian War where he served as a medical 
orderly.4  The last years of his life were both his most productive and miserable.  Despite 
producing some of his greatest works in this period of his life, he remained relatively 
unknown.5  In January of 1889, Nietzsche collapsed in the streets of Turin, Italy and 
spent his remaining years in hospitals, an asylum, and under the hospice care of his 
mother and sister.6  Reportedly, Nietzsche’s collapse precipitated “insanity,” crippling 
Nietzsche intellectually, and although the nature of his affliction has never been more 
specifically described, it was likely syphilis.  Nietzsche died at the age of 55 on August 
25, 1900 in Weimar, Germany.7   
Nietzsche’s Historical Context 
 Nietzsche references the fact that he was privileged to have lived in tumultuous 
historical circumstances: 
 I take it for a good fortune of the first order that I lived at the right time and among Germans, of 
all peoples,  so that I was ripe for this work…8  
 
An example of a tumultuous event in Europe were the Revolutions of 1848, which 
Nietzsche calls “the events of 1848,” and “grieved him [Nietzsche’s father] beyond all 
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measure.”9  These events were revolutionary uprisings across the European continent in 
which urban and rural masses demanded basic freedoms and rights, bringing Europe 
closer to abolishing a still-present aristocracy.  Germany experienced one such 
revolution, which sent a powerful message to elites, and resulted in increased freedoms 
for the growing middle class.   
 The second major historical event in Nietzsche’s lifetime was the Franco-Prussian 
War of 1870-1871 and the subsequent German unification under Otto von Bismarck.  
Nietzsche had first-hand experience with the process of German unification through his 
voluntary participation in the Franco-Prussian War.  It was during his service that he had 
a highly salient experience of human suffering after riding in a train car for three days 
with six wounded soldiers.10  A repeated theme in Nietzsche’s works is his criticism of all 
things “German” following this unification.  It is not as if a German identity did not exist 
prior to unification as unification presupposes a cohesive identity.  What Nietzsche was 
frustrated with was the popular devotion to this new entity of Germany.  This can be seen 
in Nietzsche’s break with his long-time friend Richard Wagner as a result of Wagner’s 
excessive German nationalism.11 
 During the same time, Europe experienced an increase in anti-Jewish ideologies.  
The most poignant example of anti-Jewish sentiment was the Dreyfus Affair in post-
Franco-Prussian War France in which French-Jewish military officer Alfred Dreyfus was 
accused of espionage.  Right-wing French groups and newspapers asserted Dreyfus’s 
treachery (which was unfounded; he was later acquitted of all charges) was because he 
was Jewish.  This general political and intellectual turmoil had a deep impact on 
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Nietzsche.  Many of his writings are critical of the ideals enshrined by previous German 
intellectuals such as Kant, Hegel, and Schopenhauer.  One can see their fingerprints on 
his works, whether through his criticism or appreciation.  Furthermore, his writings are 
often critical of the changing political systems in Europe, as well as the restructuring of 
the geopolitical map around new national identities to the exclusion of some identities.  
The intellectual and political events left their mark upon Nietzsche, and he returned the 
favor by leaving his posthumous mark upon the intellectual and political thought of 
Europe. 
Nietzsche’s Religious Context 
 The Enlightenment of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries created space for 
expression of discontent with traditional Christianity.  Post-Enlightenment trends show 
movement away from publicly decreed religions in the form of “cuius regio, eius religio” 
(sixteenth century “Whose region/realm, his religion”) to privatization of one’s religion.  
However, despite Enlightenment writings, religion remained a central topic of public 
discourse.  Additionally, the nineteenth century saw the formation of Christian revival 
movements across Europe, particularly in Germany prior to unification.  By Nietzsche’s 
time, religion’s public presence was showing signs of a privatization shift by moving 
from governmental proclamations to scholarly and nationalistic discourse.  As a result of 
these changes in religious discourse Nietzsche, anticipating a statement by Sigmund 
Freud in Die Zukunft einer Illusion (The Future of an Illusion), could openly criticize 
religion without fear of reprisal beyond written criticism. 
 The comparative nature of this thesis requires a brief discussion regarding the 
perceptions of religiosity of Europe by South Asians and vice versa.  Religion had a 
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greater public presence in South Asia than in Europe.  Such relative differences led to 
emotional calls by traditional religious leaders in South Asia to denounce nineteenth 
century Europe as a bastion of secularism.  Similarly, Europe’s fascination with the 
“Orient” led to the assumptions that “Eastern” life was governed by religion.  Both of 
these misinformed perspectives fail to appreciate the diversity of religious expression in 
both contexts.  However, for the purposes of this thesis it is helpful to think of Europe as 
highly secular relative to South Asia, regardless of religion’s presence in European public 
discourse.   
Overview of Nietzsche’s Religious Philosophy 
 Nietzsche was a prolific author who wrote on multiple subjects.  Given the 
breadth of topics he discussed in his writings, an overview of Nietzsche’s religious 
philosophy necessarily omits particular aspects.  Despite the variety of topics covered, 
there are recurring themes within Nietzsche’s writings that merit discussion, and critical 
to understanding the relationship between Iqbal and Nietzsche’s religious philosophy.  
The specific aspects of Nietzsche’s religious philosophy discussed are: individual 
empowerment (spirit, choice, creativity, culture), the Übermensch, eternal recurrence, 
morality, and religion.   
 General Concepts: Empowerment, the Self, Morality, and Religion 
 A common misconception regarding Nietzsche’s philosophy is that he espoused 
sheer nihilism, offering a bleak, pessimistic view of the world and human existence.  
Quite literally, nothing could be further from the truth.  In his youth, he was a pessimist, 
taking inspiration from Arthur Schopenhauer’s Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung (The 
World as Will and Idea).  However, Nietzsche’s is a life-affirming philosophy, but such 
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an understanding requires one to read beyond the words “God is dead,”12 and “What does 
not kill me, makes me stronger.”13  By examining his works in more detail, one quickly 
realizes Nietzsche’s focus in on the individual.  For example, Nietzsche states in 
Untimely Meditations (1886): 
 The man who does not wish to belong to the mass needs only to cease taking himself easily; let 
him follow  his conscience, which calls to him: ‘Be yourself!  All you are now doing, thinking, 
desiring, is you  yourself.’ 
  
 …for the idea of its [the self] liberation gives it a presentiment of the measure of happiness 
allotted it from  all eternity—a happiness to which it can by no means attain so long as it lies fettered by 
the chains of fear  and convention.14  
 
 Supporting this idea of liberation and empowering the self is Zarathustra’s 
Introductory Speech, “I love him who is of a free spirit and a free heart” in Thus Spake 
Zarathustra (1884, 1885).15  This work, considered by many to be one of Nietzsche’s 
masterpieces, takes the format of a novel in which the protagonist, the prophet 
Zarathustra (based on the Zoroastrian prophet Zoroaster), dispenses wisdom to all who 
will listen.  Many of Nietzsche’s key themes such as individual empowerment, the 
Übermensch, and Eternal Recurrence are first described in this work.  Finally, it is worth 
noting that this book was especially important to Nietzsche, and he referred to it in his 
autobiography, Ecce Homo (“Behold the Man”), as “my Zarathustra.”16   
 Examining Nietzsche’s statements further, it is clear that Nietzsche’s 
empowerment lies not in endowing humans with civil or political rights, but giving them 
the knowledge of their potential as individuals.  The problem with people’s enslavement 
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to anything other than themselves is found in section 284 of The Gay Science (1882, 
1887), a large collection of Nietzsche’s aphorisms on a variety of subjects, “Few people 
have faith in themselves.”17  It may seem reductionist to summarize Nietzsche’s 
individual empowerment ideas to believing in oneself, but it is almost that simple.  
Nietzsche conceives of God as an ideal, and if God is dead, then one has no ideal toward 
which to strive.  To avoid the ensuing nihilism, the ideal that used to be symbolized by 
God is replaced with the self.  It is this idea of the self as a new ideal that draws out the 
next idea in Nietzsche’s philosophy, going beyond oneself.   
 Nietzsche’s concept of going beyond oneself is a strange concept, but not difficult 
to comprehend.  Expressed most clearly in Thus Spake Zarathustra, Nietzsche describes 
human history as a series of overcoming ideals humans lay before themselves.18  
Zarathustra’s, and thus Nietzsche’s, question to those reading his works: “…Are ye going 
to be the ebb of this great tide and rather revert to the animal than surpass?”19  Yet, 
Nietzsche’s idea of overcoming does not describe what he means by overcoming.  
Nietzsche clarifies this when he says, “What is great in man is that he is a bridge and not 
a goal…” and “a transition and a destruction.”20  Nietzsche emphasizes that there is 
always something more to be achieved, that human psychological and philosophical 
evolution never stops.   
 Critical to self-overcoming is willing one’s own destruction, sometimes 
figuratively, or literally.21  If one can destroy what one currently is, then there is a room 
for creativity, and an ability to go beyond what one was.  Thus the paradox of creativity 
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is demonstrated—creation of something requires the destruction of something else.  
Going beyond oneself requires seeing oneself in terms of something beyond and then 
engaging in the necessary self-destruction which produces the requisite voids for self-
reconstruction.  Nietzsche stresses individual empowerment and liberation because going 
beyond oneself cannot occur while the individual is enslaved to anything else.   
 Nietzsche’s concept of morality flows from his ideas surrounding individualism, 
and going beyond all things.  Nietzsche’s classic phrase referring to his reformation of 
morality is “transvaluation of all values” or “re-valuation of all values.”22  The very 
premise of Beyond Good and Evil (1886) lies in the idea of transcending values 
themselves.  In this book Nietzsche, seeks to cover a variety of topics and understand the 
etymological origin of terms using philological methodologies.  The work is a brief 
attempt to understand the meaning, and ultimately, the value undergirding moral concepts 
taken for granted in nineteenth century European society.   
 Nietzsche, however, does not argue for a simple rejection or adoption of different 
values; rather, he advocates seeing beyond labels such as “Good” and “Evil”.  Nietzsche 
is then a harbinger of post-modern thought, in that he wants, as he says in On the 
Genealogy of Morals (1887), to “critique…moral values, the value of these values 
themselves must first be called into question…”23  This forceful book contains three 
essays discussing the various aspects of morality (i.e. “Good and Evil,” “Good and Bad,” 
“Asceticism”).  Unlike other works on morality, On the Genealogy of Morals is not a 
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philosophical treatise about morality, and instead is an etymological discussion of the 
origin surrounding moral constructs and a commentary regarding their value.   
 It is not enough to merely critique and disregard values because this leaves one 
without values.  Nietzsche argues throughout his canon that values give life meaning and 
direction, and therefore exhorts others to create their own values in line with the “Camel, 
Lion, and Child” metamorphosis.  This individual development paradigm allows an 
individual to choose his or her morality as a creative expression of themselves, rather 
than shouldering the burdens of assumed morality, or remaining in the throes of nihilism.  
Individuals may choose to behave like camels, bearing the burdens of others; or like 
lions, continually rejecting all value systems; or like children, creating the values by 
which they choose to live. 
 A final important aspect of Nietzsche’s religious-philosophy results from his 
status as a religious public thinker.  Nietzsche’s approach to religion is arguably the most 
complicated aspect of his philosophy.  Over a century after his death, his approach to 
religion is being re-evaluated, after understandably upset nerves among primarily 
Christian thinkers who refused to delve deeper into his works.  For quite some time after 
his death, his works remained within avant-garde and philosophical circles, only reaching 
the broader public after the Nazi regime adopted Nietzsche as their guiding philosopher.24  
At its most basic level, Nietzsche believes religion is a psychological-moral domain 
which provides the causes and remedies for human gaps in physiological knowledge. By 
“physiological knowledge” Nietzsche means the biological urges and/or pains that do not 
have readily apparent causes.25  Taking this point further, Nietzsche calls religion a 
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“neurosis” that serves an anesthetizing function for humans.26  This functionalist view of 
religion is Nietzsche’s primary view.  However, he also discusses a substantive approach 
biased to his European Christian context.  An aspect of Nietzsche’s view that will be 
discussed in more detail is his disdain for how religion is used to manipulate masses of 
people, similar to Marx’s characterization of religion as “the opiate of the masses.”  It 
should be noted, however, that Nietzsche feels very similarly about any systems of belief 
that subjugate the individual to something other than the individual.27   
 Individual Empowerment 
 Nietzsche’s ideas concerning individual empowerment can be categorized 
according to five emphases.  The first is an emphasis on individual choice, as only 
voluntary action can be considered an action with a moral consequence.  The second 
emphasis concerns the human spirit, and the importance for people to believe in their 
ability and power as humans.  The third emphasis is on creativity and art as expressions 
of the human spirit driving culture and society forward.  The fourth emphasis is that of 
culture itself, and how individuals shape the collective culture.  The final emphasis is 
Nietzsche’s disdain for systems that fail to recognize the supreme importance of the 
individual.  All of these emphases culminate in Nietzsche’s discussion of the 
Übermensch, which will be treated following explication of Nietzsche’s five emphases.   
 Regarding the importance of individual choice, Nietzsche is quite clear.  In some 
way or another, the idea of free choice makes its way into most of Nietzsche’s writings.  
However, in his writings Nietzsche expresses a desire for individuals to control their 
choices, to “will” their acts using his terms.  The emphasis on humans’ ability to choose 
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what they do, rather than simply following societal dictates is clearly seen in On the 
Genealogy of Morals second essay sections one and two.  In these sections, Nietzsche 
explains how true sovereignty of the self is determined by an individual’s ability to make 
promises and then fulfill them.  Nietzsche describes this ability as a reflection of an 
individual’s strength by taking an “I will” statement and making it a reality.28  This 
ability to project one’s will and desires onto reality is the individual’s ultimate freedom.  
In other books, particularly in The Gay Science sections 117, 143, and 335, Nietzsche 
treats individual choice not as social deviance, but a liberating experience to achieve 
one’s desires.29 
 The second emphasis on the human spirit flows directly from his belief in the 
individual, and the individual’s ability to make sovereign choices.  To Nietzsche, the loss 
of faith in the self represents the triumph of ressentiment morality over what is noble, and 
ultimately natural, in human beings.30  Walter Kaufmann describes ressentiment as a 
psychological frame of mind in which value judgments are based on materials and 
characteristics one does not possess.31  In simpler terms, it is the moral frame of reference 
in which one declares morally evil precisely that which one does not possess.  Nietzsche 
uses ressentiment precisely because it captures what the English words “Evil” or 
“resentment,” or the German words Böse or schlecht cannot.   
 A passage describing Nietzsche’s views on the human spirit comes from On the 
Genealogy of Morals third essay, section 24, which attacks faith in externalities.32  In this 
section, Nietzsche decries as victims of false faiths those who place blind faith in objects 
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(gods, etc.) and false “free-spirits” who still ultimately place their faith in something such 
as philosophy or science.33  Based on this and similar passages, the only real metric of 
faith is the truth it rests upon, and the only source of real Truth is the self.   
 Nietzsche’s emphasis on art, creativity, and culture are interrelated, but important 
distinctions exist.  Nietzsche’s foremost treatise on these three ideas was The Birth of 
Tragedy (1872).  In this text, Nietzsche examines European culture during his time, and 
diagnoses the death of creativity, art, and culture with the growing influence of “scientific 
art.”  He uses the rise and fall of Greek art, creativity, and culture as an analogy to 
nineteenth century Europe.  The fall of Greek society began with the introduction of 
Apollonian precision and perfectionism to the detriment of the previously reigning 
Dionysian freedom of creativity.  A society in touch with the realities of human existence 
must have the freedom of wild artistic expression if any joy is to be found in life.  With 
scientific intrusion into human expression, creativity becomes formulaic and true art dies.  
The result of such encroachment is that culture collapses and civilizations end.  
Nietzsche’s remedy is to return to art its wild passion, if not for the sake of appealing art, 
but for the sake of general creativity, expression, and the continuity of a culture.  These 
three ideas connect with individual empowerment through the Dionysian spirit within 
individuals that allows for the creative and artistic continuity of a Dionysian culture that 
embraces life.  Anything collective, such as culture, is based on the art and creativity of 
individuals, and according to Nietzsche, the Dionysian embrace of life’s dithyramb is the 
best way to maintain a dynamic culture.   
 The final emphasis regarding individual empowerment is Nietzsche’s criticism of 
systems and beliefs which inhibit the expression or the empowerment of that individual.  
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Such threats to individual empowerment include not only religion, but nationalism 
(evidenced by Nietzsche’s abhorrence for nineteenth century extreme German 
nationalism), “pale atheism,” pseudo-free spirits,34 and any system that threatens this 
expression of individualism.35  It is not the systems that Nietzsche fundamentally 
disagrees with, rather the implicit subordination of the individual these systems require. 
 Übermensch 
 One of Nietzsche’s most well-known ideas, the Übermensch, is complex.  
Considerable debate exists as to how to properly translate the term because the German 
word über is a multi-vocal term and heavily reliant on context for proper translation.  For 
the purposes of this work, preference will be given to Alexander Tille’s translation of 
“Beyond-Man”.  While other scholars translate the term as “Superman” or “Overman,” 
given Nietzsche’s penchant for things “Beyond,” it seems to be the most appropriate. 
However, the translation “Overman” would not be wholly incorrect either, as Nietzsche 
presents humans as something to be overcome.  However, this section does not seek to 
give a treatise regarding this idea, but merely offers a discussion of the topic to make 
comparisons between Nietzsche’s Übermensch and Iqbal’s insan-i kamil more 
compelling.  The critical ideas concerning the Übermensch are how one, if it is possible, 
becomes Übermensch, its qualities, and its purpose.   
 The first use of the word Übermensch occurs in Thus Spake Zarathustra, and a 
central theme to the work is what the Übermensch can achieve.  The term is found in 
Zarathustra’s first speech entitled “Of the Three Metamorphoses”36 where Nietzsche 
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describes his Camel-Lion-Child three stage process through which all individuals must 
pass.  Each stage has a specific meaning and function within an individual’s development 
toward becoming an Übermensch.  
 The Camel stage is how many individuals live the entirety of their lives, and is 
perhaps the “easiest” of the stages for an individual.  The Camel, as its name implies, 
bears the burden of society’s existing morality.  Humans are born without the ability to 
choose their morality, and are socialized to adhere to certain norms.  The purpose of the 
Camel is to follow these mores because at this early stage in the spiritual development of 
an individual, the individual can do nothing else.  However, at a certain point in certain 
individuals’ lives, the assumed load of society’s morality becomes ever burdensome, and 
the weight engenders questions within the Camel.  This questioning, as the Camel 
“hasteth to its own desert,”37 leads it to the second phase in individual spiritual 
development.  
 The second spiritual phase is the Lion, in which the Camel shrugs off the assumed 
morality and norms of society.  It is in this stage that the individual questions these mores 
and values, and decides whether they have any relevance to the individual’s life.  The 
Lion is a “Holy Nay,”38 in which all values are recognized as created, and all value in 
these values is called into question.  However, the Lion is incapable of creativity to 
develop new values.  Thus, an individual cannot remain a Lion, or else the individual 
risks a life in nihilistic misery.  This necessity for creating new values leads the Lion to 
become the final spiritual metamorphosis, the Child. 
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 The Child is, according to Nietzsche, “innocence and oblivion, a new starting, a 
play, a wheel rolling by itself, a prime motor, a holy asserting.”39  This is Nietzsche’s 
way of describing humans’ innate creative energy, which is capable of formulating new 
values out of the ashes of the old values destroyed by the Lion.  This is the life-affirming 
phase within Nietzsche’s philosophy, embracing a new life adhering to the newly created 
values.   
 The next question regarding Nietzsche’s Übermensch is what constitutes such an 
individual?  Furthermore, have any Übermenschen existed?  To the first question, 
Zarathustra provides a detailed list of the Übermensch’s qualities is in his introductory 
speech.  Among the attributes of the Übermensch are the “lightning…[and the] 
insanity”40 required to go against society’s values.  The Übermensch is also defined in 
terms of what it is not, the letzte Mensch or “last-man.”41  The letzte Mensch is 
contemptible, hardly human.  It is the state of individuals who no longer “despise”42 
themselves enough to want to go beyond themselves.  The letzte Mensch is content with 
the present achievement of humans— the Übermensch is not.  The Übermensch is an 
individual that continually strives to go beyond itself, to “…willeth his own 
destruction”43 in order that something new may be created from the ashes.  The 
Übermensch is the ultimate creative, sovereign, individual force in society continually 
pushing for greater achievements beyond humans.   
 Nietzsche is not a teleologist, but purpose exists within his religio-philosophical 
framework.  This includes the Übermensch, and one must ask what the purpose of such 
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an individualistic, creative force is?  The answer is alluded to in Zarathustra’s 
introductory speech.  Repeatedly, Zarathustra reminds his audience that the Übermensch 
is a new ideal for society to strive toward, telling them plainly to will the destruction of 
all that they know to clear a path for the Übermensch.44  An important aspect of the 
purpose of the Übermensch rests in knowing Nietzsche’s concept of God and gods as 
“ideals” within a society.  With God dead, society no longer has the ideal being for a 
behavioral model, but Zarathustra says the Übermensch is to be society’s new God-ideal.  
Furthermore, the Übermensch is not an unattainable ideal.  In his discussion of letzte 
Mensch, Zarathustra tells the people that they do not have to settle for this “last man,” but 
rather they still “have chaos within to enable one to give birth to a dancing star.  I tell 
you: ye have still got chaos within.”45  This chaos is what is required to pass from the 
Camel to the Lion stage and from the Lion to the Child stage in the Übermensch’s 
metamorphosis.  However, Zarathustra’s urgency in proclaiming the Übermensch 
indicates that the required chaos to seek the Übermensch is finite, and when it is gone, 
humans will become letzte Menschen.   
 The Übermensch is an achievable ideal, which necessitates the conception of new 
ideals that society strives toward in an effort to continually develop and cultivate the 
human spirit.  Zarathustra’s statement: “What with man is the ape?  A joke or a sore 
shame.  Man shall be the same for beyond-man, a joke or a sore shame.”46  The 
Übermensch takes on a prophetic role, in which it serves as a beacon of individualism.  
At the same time, the Übermenschen are to rule society because societies will always 
have noble and the ignoble classes, analogous to the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.  
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Thus the Übermensch serves the purpose of guiding others toward the individualism that 
creates an Übermensch, by not denying its obvious superiority over “lesser humans” and 
exercising its sovereignty.  Power is what drives the Übermensch toward its 
individualism, and it exercises its power until it too is surpassed by something greater.   
 
 Eternal Recurrence 
 The “Doctrine” of Eternal Recurrence is a prominent idea in Thus Spake 
Zarathustra, and is the entire subject of the chapter entitled “Of the Vision and the 
Riddle.”47  To understand this idea, it is important to explain the riddle and provide its 
context within the overall story of Thus Spake Zarathustra, as well as provide an analysis 
of what the riddle could mean. 
 The riddle itself is a highly confusing part of the story.  The context of the chapter 
is Zarathustra has left his early companions and is currently on board a ship.  He has 
developed a reputation as Zarathustra, but his identity on the ship is unknown.  However, 
the word spreads that Zarathustra is on board, and the sailors immediately began to ask 
him questions to which he gave no answers.48  Finally, he decides to speak and gives 
them the riddle and the vision.  The characters in this particular section (one of the 
longest in the book) are Zarathustra and a Dwarf.  Zarathustra approaches a mountain 
path and immediately hears the voice of the Dwarf comparing Zarathustra to a stone cast 
in the air, which must come down again, upon itself.49  Zarathustra then describes how 
courage, even in the face of the abyss, or non-existence, is the best of all virtues.  Then an 
argument ensues in which Zarathustra describes himself at a point in a road which 
                                                 
47
 Ibid., 222-29. 
48
 Ibid., 222. 
49
 Ibid., 223-24. 
 - 65 - 
stretches eternally in either direction.50  The Dwarf replies to Zarathustra with a 
paradoxical statement, “ ‘All that is straight lieth,’ murmured the dwarf with contempt. 
‘All truth is crooked, time itself is a circle.’”51  This statement is the first instance hinting 
at Eternal Recurrence, or the idea that time loops eternally.  Zarathustra responds in kind: 
 Behold,’ I continued, ‘this moment! From this gateway called moment a long, eternal lane runneth 
 backward: behind us lieth an eternity.   
  
 Must not all that can run of things have run already through this lane?  Must not what can happen 
of things  have happened, have been done and  run past here?  
  
 And if all things have happened already: what dost thou dwarf think of this moment?  Must not 
this  gateway have existed previously also?   
 
 And are not thus all things knotted fast together that this moment draweth behind it all future 
things?   Consequently—draweth itself, as well? 
 
 For what can run of things—in that long lane out there, it must run once more!  
 
 And this slow spider, creeping in the moonshine, and this moonshine itself, and I and thou in the 
gateway  whispering together, whispering of eternal things, must not we all have existed once in the past? 
 
 And must we not recur and run in that other lane, out there, before us, in that long haunted lane—
must we  not recur eternally?52 
 
Time here is not defined as a discrete measure, but instead is continuous and irreducible 
to its individual components.  According to this view of time, there is no Prime Mover, 
time simply was, is, and will be, with every moment repeating itself.   
 Given Eternal Recurrence is posed in the form of a riddle, many interpretations 
are possible.  Many have taken the riddle and the vision at face value, and declared that 
Nietzsche simply means life repeats itself eternally.  One could also view this as an 
elegiac metaphor for creativity, implying that “there is nothing new under the sun.”53  
However, a new interpretation emerges by placing the riddle in the context of another 
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section in Thus Spake Zarathustra entitled “Of Free Death.”54  In this particular chapter, 
Zarathustra makes the following profound, although brief, point relevant to Nietzsche’s 
overall thought: 
 In dying your spirit and your virtue shall glow on, like the evening-red round the earth: or else 
your dying  hath not succeeded well.55  
 
Eternal Recurrence, then, is no longer about life recurring eternally, but rather values.  
Furthermore, since this statement acknowledges dying, as Nietzsche does elsewhere, it 
makes more sense to think of Eternal Recurrence as a thought experiment, rather than a 
“Doctrine.”  The thought experiment reads: Only values chosen by the individual actually 
have any value to the individual.  Imagine having to live an infinite number of lives with 
one’s current set of values.  Would these lives be worth living under these values for all 
eternity?  If the answer is no, then there is reason to evaluate one’s values such that one 
embraces the Eternal Recurrence of life.  This willingness to live countless lives under a 
particular set of values is Nietzsche’s amor fati, or love of fate.  Instead of a bleak 
fatalism and resignation to life, Eternal Recurrence prompts the reader to question how 
much one loves one’s life, whether one would be truly happy if fated to repeat life 
eternally under the current set of values.  
 Morals 
 Nietzsche’s concept of morality can best be summed up by his work On The 
Genealogy of Morals in which he systematically breaks down the origin of Western 
European morality.  The overall idea regarding morality portrayed in this book is that 
morality, good, bad, evil, punishment, guilt, and innocence are all terms based in ancient 
systems of class structure.  What is characteristic of the upper class, the noble class, is 
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good, and what is bad is related to the lower classes.56  Evil, according to Nietzsche is an 
entirely separate concept from bad, owing to its different etymological origin and 
conceptualization.  According to Nietzsche the concept of evil is rooted in ressentiment 
morality, in which what is not characteristic of one’s class is evil.57  This works in both 
directions, with the noble, good individuals equating weakness with Evil, and the lower, 
ressentiment classes characterizing noble behavior as evil.58  Evil, then, is that which 
contradicts one’s understanding of moral behavior, or human nature.  Nietzsche errs on 
the side of power and sees ressentiment morality as debasing humanity, and thus, evil.   
 What is important to understand about Nietzsche’s conception of morality is that 
social groups base their moral systems on what benefits them as individuals.  Morality is 
purely a human construct and is related to human valuation of material wealth.  Nietzsche 
further considers the subjects of what makes actions moral and immoral and who makes 
such judgments.  To the first, moral actions are those which are actions chosen by an 
individual’s free spirit, and if moral weight is assigned to them, then they are moral.  
Thus, morality is highly relative with the only real criterion being that morality and moral 
actions be chosen by an individual.59  What is required to have this power to choose is 
sovereignty over oneself.60  Immorality is also easily defined by the individual, but again 
requires the ability of true choice, which cannot occur until one is sovereign.  The 
ultimate judge of morality lies in both the individual and the beholder.  Nietzsche, 
however, differentiates moral judgments from legal judgments, which are constructs of 
the dominant morality of society.  If it be noble morality, then laws reflect what noble 
                                                 
56
 Nietzsche, Genealogy, 27-28. 
57
 Ibid., 33-34. 
58
 Ibid. 
59
 For clarification see Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, 144. 
60
 Nietzsche, Genealogy, 72-73. 
 - 68 - 
morality finds moral and immoral, just and unjust, and vice versa with ressentiment 
morality.61  Justice and punishment cannot exist without laws that declare what is legal 
and illegal, but moral and immoral can exist independent of societal law because the 
individual is the ultimate judge. 
 Religion 
 Understanding Nietzsche’s concept of religion requires first that one recognizes 
how critical nuance is, as his ideas regarding religion are complex, subtle, layered, and 
require careful analysis.  The following section proposes to discuss Nietzsche’s concept 
of religion, and how it related to public conceptions of religion at the time, as well as 
broach the subject of origin and morality of religion.  Finally, a brief analysis will be 
offered regarding Nietzsche’s stance on religion, and a brief description of his thoughts 
on Christianity, Judaism, and Islam.   
 Central to this thesis is Nietzsche’s conception of religion.  If one were to seek a 
definition of religion within Nietzsche’s canon, the closest one could come to is: “a 
psychological-moral domain” likened to a collective, historical neurosis that serves a 
function of explaining natural phenomena, creating power hierarchies, promoting 
individual and societal progression, and requires faith in something other than oneself62 
and two inventions:  
 …to posit a particular kind of life and every day customs that have the effect of a discplina 
voluntatis  (discipline of the will) and at the same time abolish boredom—and then: to bestow on 
this life style an  interpretation that makes it appear to be illuminated by the highest value so that this life 
style becomes  something for which one fights and under certain circumstances sacrifices one’s life.63  
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This complex definition draws upon multiple references in Nietzsche’s thought, and 
expresses Nietzsche’s fundamental idea that religion serves a function for human beings.  
Whether this function is orienting oneself in the universe, or describing a way for one to 
relate to one’s experiences, religion serves some function involving faith in something 
other than oneself.  Furthermore, Nietzsche believes religion is inherently anti-rational, 
likely due to his upbringing in the Pietism movement.  Religion, then, also serves an 
emotional function allowing humans to express a variety of emotions within the confines 
of a single articulating system.  Nietzsche rejects the Truth of any religion, believing 
instead that the truth of a religion rests on what individuals believe to be true.  He is not 
necessarily the enemy of religion, but wants readers to see religion as an anti-rational, 
human constructed system to explain a variety of human experiences.  How one chooses 
to use religion is up to the individual, and Nietzsche offers his opinions, but the 
individual’s decision is paramount and final.   
 It is fascinating to place this conception in his context, and compare it to the 
predominant conception of the time.  Nineteenth century Europe remained heavily 
Christian, despite the writings of many Enlightenment elites against religion.  As an 
example, Voltaire may have been critical of religion to the point of its abolition, but that 
did not change the fact that most French citizens in his time were either Protestant or 
Catholic.  The interesting trend within Nietzsche’s lifetime was the changing conceptions 
of public and private religion.  Furthermore, secularism was gaining ground, but not 
enough to support Max Weber’s Secularization Theory.64  Nietzsche’s definition was 
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very much a functional, historical, and private definition, which he disseminated to a 
European public who still conceptualized religion as substantive, divine, and important to 
public life.  This binary view of Nietzschean religion and nineteenth century European 
religion is somewhat misleading, but informative in understanding Nietzsche’s “re-
valuing of all values” campaign. 
 The origin of religion lies with early human ancestors seeking a way to explain 
the universe and phenomena around them, and absolve them of certain responsibilities.65  
Each religious founder is an individual or group of individuals who have recognized 
others’ inability to comprehend the world and dominate their “lesser minds.”66  For such 
abilities, Nietzsche holds such founders in high esteem.  However, Nietzsche abhors the 
“fruits” of their systems and the overall negative impact they have on the human spirit.    
 Equally critical is understanding Nietzsche’s vehement criticism of religion.  He 
intentionally provoked his readers to serve his purpose of revitalizing European culture 
and human dignity.  When Nietzsche attacks religion, as he does in The Antichrist (1888), 
it appears to be a general polemical critique of Christianity and religion.  However, 
embedded in these criticisms of Christianity and religion is Nietzsche’s attack on the real 
enemy of personal enslavement.  To Nietzsche, religion was the prime example of an 
enslaving system, and he attacked it more as an example rather than venting pure hatred 
for religion.  This is an important nuance in Nietzsche’s thought, which often is 
overlooked.  Just as morality is relative to Nietzsche, his evaluations of religion are 
purely his.  In addition to his opinions, they also reflect his nineteenth century European 
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Christian historical context, and certain doctrinal issues central to the religions he 
criticizes.  Nietzsche also criticizes religions because they are systems that have such 
high ideals that it is all the more disappointing when they fail to achieve.  Given this 
situation of failing to meet its own lofty ideals, Nietzsche argues it is better to do away 
with religion and start anew with the self.  Religion is not inherently moral or immoral, 
useful or useless, but rather is a system that can either aid humans in empowerment or 
prevent empowerment.  In Nietzsche’s view, the latter of these descriptions is the 
overwhelming majority of cases regarding religion.   
 Specific references to Judaism, Christianity by Nietzsche are frequent and rare for 
Islam.  This could be due to the fact that Nietzsche, being a philologist and not an 
Orientalist, had little knowledge about Islam.  However, what references are available 
reflect that he had a basic knowledge of Islam for his time.  His stance toward Judaism is 
one of mixed praise and contempt.  He lauds Judaism for having a concept of God that 
serves as a model for a powerful human being, but disparages Judaism’s development of 
a priesthood, and ressentiment morality.  Christianity receives a similar review, in that 
Nietzsche actually admires Jesus’ message, but not the Pauline interpretation of it.  The 
emphases on suffering and wholehearted adoption of ressentiment morality are the 
glaring negatives of Christianity, which spoil the entirety of the religion.  As for Islam, 
Nietzsche likens it to Judaism, and appreciates the emphasis on a strong God-ideal.  In 
fact, Nietzsche wrote to his friend Carl von Gersdorff that he wanted “to live among 
Muslims for a good long time, especially where their faith is most devout: in this way I 
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expect to hone my appraisement and my eye for all that is European.”67  Furthermore, he 
states in The Will to Power (1901) that Islam is: 
 …an affirmative Semitic religion, the product of a ruling class, looks like: the law-book of 
Mohammed, the  older parts of the Old Testament.  (Mohammedanism, as a religion for men, is deeply 
contemptuous of the  sentimentality and mendaciousness of Christianity— which it feels to be a 
woman’s religion.).68  
 
Despite the questions of authenticity surrounding The Will to Power due to posthumous 
editing, it remains that Nietzsche saw Islam as a religion of strength, though likely sheer 
brute strength versus strength of will, reflecting his understanding of the Islamic 
conception of God.   
Conclusion 
 If one were to describe Nietzsche as briefly as possible, the following words 
might come to mind: provocative, prolific, sarcastic, caustic, and clever.  Nietzsche was 
all of these adjectives rolled into one individual who felt driven to share his concerns 
about European culture and society.  Nietzsche’s religious philosophy is really one of 
tragic recognition:  tragic in that he believed that the ideals, morals, and the God of true 
Christianity as preached by Jesus were dead.  Recognizing this, Nietzsche felt that it was 
necessary to fill the void of a lifeless Christianity with a renewed belief in the individual, 
and the capability of the individual.   
 Contrary to some conceptions, Nietzsche’s religious philosophy is one of the 
furthest from nihilism.  Nietzsche explicitly wants humans to achieve their potential, and 
not wallow in the misery a dead Christianity leaves behind.  One of Nietzsche’s chief 
concerns lies with individual’s reasserting their power in the face of so many centuries of 
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ressentiment morality and the denial of the nature of humans.  True logic and morality 
flow from their harmony with human nature.  This nature, according to Nietzsche, is a 
drive he calls the will to power (Wille zur Macht), which causes humans to want to better 
themselves, and discard anything preventing this process should be discarded.  That 
Nietzsche regards religion, along with other systems and    “–isms,” as a hindrance is not 
a reflection of the religion; rather it is a recognition that religion had failed and continued 
to fail to live up to its own moral standards.  In a rather strange way, his critique of 
religion, especially Christianity, makes him a religious thinker of the “highest order.”69   
 His consciousness of what religion was supposed to provide the individual, and 
the religious institutions’ failure to provide, drove him to criticize and ultimately discard 
the utility of such institutions.  As an individual who spent the greater part of his life 
thinking about religion, human relations, morality, and empowerment, Nietzsche is a 
religious individual.  Failure to recognize this is to miss most of Nietzsche’s greatest 
insights.  Nietzsche’s thought was embraced by avant-garde circles that idolized him, 
something he would have likely never approved of, and conservative circles that 
demonized him not for his thought, but his “madness.”70  This lack of genuine readership 
and analysis among most Europeans is perhaps what allowed a non-European like 
Muhammad Iqbal to read Nietzsche and recognize within his thought ideas compatible 
with Iqbal’s goals for Islam, and ideas Iqbal believed antithetical to Islam.  Ultimately, 
Nietzsche’s “religiosity” piqued Iqbal’s interest and led to one of the most interesting 
transnational intellectual encounters in the twentieth century.
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Chapter 3: Similarities and Differences between Iqbal’s and Nietzsche’s Religious 
Philosophies 
 The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the particular instances of convergence 
and divergence between Iqbal’s and Nietzsche’s religious philosophies.  To note an 
important complexity, convergence and divergence may occur simultaneously on 
different levels of the same concept.  The exploration of possible mechanisms underlying 
the convergence and divergence will occur in subsequent chapters. 
Similarities and Differences 
 The precise number of recognized similarities and differences between these two 
religious philosophies is likely to vary from reader to reader.  However, after reviewing 
these religious philosophies, several salient instances surface and warrant further 
discussion.  This chapter will combine the discussion of similarities and differences for 
the purposes of comprehension.  Similar aspects within a concept will be introduced first, 
followed by any points of divergence.  Ideas with both convergent and divergent levels 
are: the Übermensch and insan-i kamil, individual empowerment, religion, and Eternal 
Recurrence and Heaven/Hell.  The only instance where these two religious philosophies 
completely converge is regarding the three stages of human development. 
 Übermensch and insan-i kamil  
 The first instance of similarity between Iqbal and Nietzsche is their ideas of 
insan-i kamil and the Übermensch respectively.  Both have a messianic nature to them 
and both of them share personality characteristics.  Insan-i kamil is strong-willed, fully 
submissive to God, and a product of his/her history and culture, but with the nuance that 
the ways of submitting to God are reformulated.  For Nietzsche, the Übermensch is a 
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strong-willed, fully alive individual who has reformed culture by destroying old values 
and creating new values.  In both ideas, there is the critical action of destroying old 
foundations and knowledge, and reconstructing thought and culture. Nietzsche’s 
paradigm example is Zarathustra, with Jesus and Muhammad—the latter also being 
Iqbal’s paradigmatic example—both serving as examples of “near” Übermenschen.  
 These two models of human perfection serve a societal function, but their most 
important function is for individuals.  Both ideas are dynamic modes of behavior and not 
finite goals.  Being an insan-i kamil or the Übermensch is not a static condition, but 
identifiable by an individual’s behavior.  The very idea behind the insan-i kamil and the 
Übermensch is an inherent dynamism, and is a description subject to change.  This is not 
to imply that one can lose one’s identity as insan-i kamil or the Übermensch, but it is 
important to understand that these identities are rooted in behavior reflecting profound 
insight into the self.  As such, if an individual should begin to cease behaving in ways 
that do not reflect self-transcending values, one is no longer insan-i kamil or the 
Übermensch.  As both thinkers would admit, this is a hypothetical situation as the effort 
necessary to become insan-i kamil or the Übermensch implies that an individual will 
pursue self-transcendence and behave dynamically as part of their new identities.    
 A distinction between Iqbal’s and Nietzsche’s religious philosophy is how these 
two ideals form humanity’s antidote against the poison of cultural or religious decadence.  
Iqbal believes society requires three changes to remain dynamic and pursue the evolving 
ideals of social justice:  “1) A spiritual interpretation of the universe, 2) Spiritual 
emancipation of the individual, 3) Basic principles of a universal import directing the 
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evolution of human society on a spiritual basis.”1  The individual who leads society in 
these changes is the insan-i kamil.  On the other hand, the Übermensch uses his/her will 
to power to resurrect creative art in society.  Although some interpret Nietzsche’s 
philosophy as inherently oligarchic or autocratic, he clearly wanted all to reach their full 
potential.  Supporting this claim are sections 270, 335, and 354 in The Gay Science where 
Nietzsche calls for all individuals to assert themselves against imposed morality.  These 
statements are not directed at specific individuals, such as elites, or bourgeoisie, but to 
all.  Linguistic evidence of his desire for all to achieve individual empowerment is his use 
of plural pronouns when making his arguments for individual empowerment.2   
Another distinction is Nietzsche’s belief that only a few could achieve their full 
potential.  What is important to notice is the difference between Nietzsche’s desire and 
what he believes is realistic.  Nietzsche wants everyone to be empowered, but does not 
believe that all will engage in the process of liberating themselves from the burden of 
society’s values.  There is nothing oligarchic or autocratic about this belief; it recognizes 
the path to empowerment is not easy, and discourages individuals from changing 
themselves.  Analyzing Nietzsche politically reveals his greatest fear is the thought of 
morally enslaved masses in power via democratic rule.  Therefore, he is pragmatic in his 
belief that society ought to be governed by those most capable.  If this is a select group of 
Übermenschen, or a democratic polity of Übermenschen does not matter.  What he is 
more concerned about is the empowerment of individuals, and creating an environment in 
which they can pursue their own empowerment.  Iqbal, however, read into Nietzsche a 
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non-egalitarian structure for society and politics.  In this respect, Iqbal believed Nietzsche 
to be a cultural elite attempting to maintain his position of privilege over the masses.  
Iqbal saw autocracy as a logical conclusion of Nietzsche’s philosophy, and vehemently 
opposed it as antithetical to democratic and Islamic values of egalitarianism.3   
 Iqbal’s solutions to modernity’s problems are in conflict with Nietzsche’s cultural 
rebuilding ideas.  Iqbal’s society needs to have a spiritual basis because he rejects the 
Christian dualities of mind/body and church/state.4  For Nietzsche, Western Europe’s 
long-held spiritual basis was no longer capable of effectively solving society’s problems, 
thus necessitating its removal.  Iqbal’s second solution calls for individual spiritual 
emancipation, and although Nietzschean in appearance, is different.  Nietzsche’s spiritual 
emancipation is along the lines of liberating oneself from the hindrance of religion and 
actualizing potential.  Iqbal’s spiritual emancipation is communing with the Ultimate 
Reality through Perfect Submission.  Self-liberation in Iqbal’s eyes is the realization that 
one’s individuality is tied to God’s individuality (tawhid).  He believes that approaching 
the attributes of God leads to perfect individuation.  It is helpful to think of this as a 
khalifah creating his/her own taqdir, and thereby developing his/her own tawhid.  Iqbal 
did not describe the process as such because it would be seen as extremely blasphemous 
to suggest that individuals can cultivate individual tawhid.  Blasphemy aside, the idea of 
“individual tawhid” cultivated by a khalifah’s writing of his/her own taqdir is a useful 
paradigm for understanding how Iqbal sees individuals’ uniqueness as tied to God’s 
uniqueness.  Iqbal therefore desires emancipated individuals working together in order 
for society to continue its spiritual evolution.  
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 Nietzsche would find this desire unacceptable because it is equivalent to wanting 
society to move toward the Übermensch only to regress back to the confines of human 
spirituality.  Nietzsche’s phrase “God is dead,”5 means that creativity’s previous 
inspiration is dead, and the God now worshipped stifles humans’ creativity.  With God 
dead, there is no space for spirituality because spirituality, inextricably tied to the God, is 
inimical to human creativity and empowerment.  Conversely, Iqbal argues that a constant 
link between individuals and the divine is the solution to society’s ills by helping 
empowered individuals navigate modernity.   
 Individual Empowerment 
 Central to the thought of these two thinkers is the empowerment of the individual.  
For both Iqbal and Nietzsche, living as a fully empowered individual is the only way to 
live one’s life in harmony with human nature.  To both thinkers, living otherwise 
implicitly or explicitly denies the qualities separating humans from animals and fear 
one’s human nature, implying such an individual is a coward.  Iqbal viewed individual 
empowerment as a means of building strong communities by first cultivating strong 
individuals.  Nietzsche’s emphasis on individual empowerment follows a similar line of 
thought.  Without strong individuals, substantive pursuits such as culture and art cannot 
progress and impact society as a whole.   
 Another similarity regarding individual empowerment is the discrete stage 
progression required to achieve such empowerment and its innate and acquired origins.  
Promoted by Rousseau and the Qur’an,6 all humans begin their lives in an empowered 
state, but society’s rules or rote religious practice strip them of this initial power.  As an 
                                                 
5
 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 167, 181-82. 
6
 Qur’an 95:5. 
 - 79 - 
individual matures and questions his/her thoughts and beliefs, the individual embarks on 
the path to empowerment.  After much internal struggle, the individual emerges from the 
ashes of the former life to a life with new morality and insights.  For both thinkers the 
process is the same, and only achieved by confronting the abyss and using one’s strength 
to reach one’s potential.   
 The function of individual empowerment is freeing an individual from servitude 
to imposed morality and beliefs, and modeling the process of achieving individuality for 
others.  The insan-i kamil and the Übermensch are charged with demonstrating the 
possibilities of reaching deeper into the religion or going beyond oneself.  Others are not 
to explicitly imitate the insan-i kamil or the Übermensch because the only being worth 
imitating is God or oneself.  Rather, the method by which they achieved their respective 
fate, or taqdir, is supposed to inspire others, not the exact outcomes of their struggles.  
 The main differences between Iqbal and Nietzsche’s ideas are the ways through 
which an individual achieves empowerment.  Iqbal believes empowerment can only come 
through religion, whereas Nietzsche believes it can only come by removing religion.  The 
distinction lies in that Iqbal’s belief that individuality and empowerment are attained by 
approaching the most unique being in existence, God.  Rooted in tawhid, Iqbal’s 
definition of approaching means developing the characteristics of God within oneself 
which leads to the individual’s individuation.  Nietzsche, however, categorically rejects 
any notion of imitating another to attain individuality.  To be an individual, one must 
differentiate oneself from others through choice and personally created value systems.  
The only use another individual has for one’s pursuit of individual empowerment is 
modeling the struggle of achieving empowerment.  For Nietzsche, the idea of imitating 
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another’s attributes or values would defeat the purpose of individuation and 
empowerment.  In summary, Iqbal believes in imitating the attributes of God to 
differentiate the individual from others whereas Nietzsche sees the creation of one’s own 
values distinct from others as the source of individuation.  This difference, unlike others, 
is not subtle, and is easily observed in each individual’s writings on the subject of 
individualism and empowerment. 
 Religion 
 To discuss the similarities of each religious philosophy, it is necessary to return to 
each individual’s definition of religion.  For Iqbal, religion is: 
 ‘a system of general truths which have the effect of transforming character when they are 
 sincerely held  and vividly apprehended.’7  
 
Iqbal reduces religion to a set of truths, and believes that these truths, fully apprehended, 
have the power to transform behavior.  The question then arises of what it means to fully 
apprehend something.  In Iqbal’s terms, true belief is the state of being in which one’s 
behavior reflects an esoteric understanding of sacred texts and values therein.  It is not a 
blind faith that ignores the rational basis underlying the laws within religion, nor is it 
purely intellectual commitment.  It is a state of being in which one’s grounding in the 
core values of sacred texts makes one adaptive to changing circumstances and able to 
making textual values societal realities.   
For Nietzsche, religion is best defined as: 
 “a psychological-moral domain”8 “posit[ing] a particular kind of life and every day customs that 
have the  effect of a disciplina voluntatis (discipline of the will) and at the same time abolish[es] 
boredom—and  then: to bestow[s] on this life style a interpretation that makes it appear to be illuminated 
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by the highest  value so that this life style becomes something for which one fights and under certain 
circumstances  sacrifices one’s life.9  
 
Religion is then a coping mechanism codified into a moral system.   This codification 
process requires interpretation, and necessarily rationalization, but Nietzsche does not 
claim that such rationalizations make the entire system rational.  Rather, they provide the 
necessary justifications for expected behavioral norms.  By shaping the behavior of 
individuals, the beliefs are reinforced, which are then reciprocally reinforced by behavior.  
Beliefs reinforce actions, and actions reinforce beliefs such that an individual who truly 
believes the proscriptions necessarily acts on them by believing in the moral good of such 
actions.  
Religion, for both Iqbal and Nietzsche, is a system based in a set of beliefs that 
drive one to action.  Furthermore, Iqbal’s religion is “…an expression of the whole 
man,”10 and merges with Nietzsche’s view that religion disciplines one’s will.  Religion, 
then, is far more than a system of “Shall’s and Shall not’s”—it is a system of being 
informed by rationalizations of behavioral norms.  This view of religion as a system of 
being emphasizing action is the influential link between Iqbal and Nietzsche’s views on 
individual empowerment.   
 One of the main differences separating Iqbal and Nietzsche concerns the uses and 
the goals of religion.  Some of this variance is attributable to contextual differences, but 
some can be attributed to their views on eschatology and human destiny.  Iqbal believes 
in a judgment and an end to earthly human existence.  Nietzsche, inspired by the newly 
popular biological theory of evolution, believes in the continuity of human existence 
without a divine judgment.    
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 The final difference is the tone with which each addresses religion.  Even if 
Nietzsche was “a religious man of the highest order,”11 the tone of his writings was 
critical of the religion of his time.  Sometimes Nietzsche’s criticisms of religion are 
humorous jabs rather than actual scholarly criticism, but rarely is Nietzsche sympathetic 
toward religion.  Iqbal, being a religious individual, generally expresses a favorable 
attitude and tone toward religion.  In rare instances he lashes out at immature belief, or 
beliefs he considers inferior, and such reactions form the basis of Shikwa and Jawab-i 
Shikwa.  This general difference in tone is indicative of how each author approaches 
religion within an empowerment paradigm.   
 Eternal Recurrence and Heaven/Hell 
 On the surface, these two concepts appear unrelated, but closer inspection reveals 
certain commonalities.  Iqbal’s Heaven and Hell are not localities, but posthumous 
mental states.  It is unclear whether he refers to actual neural experience after death, or if 
an individual’s soul experiences the localities.  Iqbal, however, is highly spiritual and it is 
not unreasonable to think that such experience occurs in one’s soul.  This complicates the 
matter of Heaven and Hell because the existence of a soul generates a new set of 
questions regarding the soul’s experience.  Based on his lack of detail regarding Heaven 
and Hell, the important point is that the Qur’an’s descriptions are taken by Iqbal to be 
metaphorical descriptions of posthumous experience.  Regarding, Nietzsche’s Eternal 
Recurrence, it is unclear if the experience is literal or figurative.  This thesis has argued 
for the latter, as Nietzsche does not believe in life after death.   
These two ideas are similar in that they both pose a thought experiment regarding 
the afterlife.  Nietzsche’s question asks the reader to consider his or her values, and 
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whether one would change one’s values if one had to live by such values for eternity.  If 
the answer is no, then one must evaluate one’s values.  If the answer is yes, then an 
individual is fully sovereign and capable of making moral choices.  Iqbal asks the reader 
to consider if his or her actions would please the Creator.  For individuals desiring 
Heaven, the three stages of religious development serve as a guide. Individuals must first 
bear the burden of belief, and then when the load becomes too heavy, to examine its 
significance.  This examination period, if fruitful, provides the believer with the answers 
to the questions the religious burden creates.  This stage of knowing why one must 
behave in certain ways leads to a merging of one’s human will with God’s.  When this 
occurs, the satisfaction overwhelms the believer, who voluntarily and cheerfully orients 
his or her behavior to align with the code that is God’s will.  This necessarily makes 
society more just, and pleases the Creator so that upon death, the believer experiences 
bliss, or Heaven.     
 For Nietzsche, the feeling of “Heaven” is the assurance one has when one answers 
the question of Eternal Recurrence with an affirmative answer: Yes, I would be willing to 
live forever by these values.  Morally, this is equivalent to Kant’s Categorical Imperative, 
or the philosophical version of the “Golden Rule.”  Adhering only to that which you 
could do so for eternity mirrors Kant’s belief that only those actions that are acceptable 
for all to do can be considered morals.  To Nietzsche’s chagrin, this exposes him as a 
moralist.  He does not advocate a specific moral code, but rather the development of 
individually acceptable morals.  These may or may not differ from the individual’s 
current value system, but the distinction is that they are chosen rather than imposed.  
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Nietzsche and Iqbal believe this choice in moral behavior is critical to genuine, evaluable 
moral behavior.  
Conversely, Hell is a state in which one must live eternally by values that enslave.  
Individuals who fail the development process experience the corrective process of Hell to 
provide them with the power to create values oriented toward social justice.  The negative 
answer to Nietzsche’s Eternal Recurrence resembles Hell in that the individual is now 
aware of the fact that his or her morals are not what he or she wants.  This dissonant 
situation of holding moral beliefs incongruous with one’s desires is Nietzsche’s Hell. 
 However, differences arise regarding these ideas when Iqbal calls Eternal 
Recurrence “fatalism worse than the one summed up in the word Qismat (‘destiny’).”12  
His objection is grounded in his belief that Eternal Recurrence implies an inability to 
change one’s path.  Iqbal debunks Eternal Recurrence with three statements regarding 
immortality drawn from the Qur’an.  The first statement is that “the ego has a beginning 
in time and did not pre-exist.”13  The second is that “there is no possibility of return to 
this earth.”14  The final statement about immortality is the strongest one and also the one 
that is furthest from Nietzsche’s philosophy, “that finitude is not a misfortune.”15  Paul 
Tillich described Nietzsche as an individual keenly aware of “the threat of non-being,” 
causing him a “melancholy happiness.”16  This attitude of both sorrow and finitude 
reflects Nietzsche’s belief that death gives life meaning.  This is to say that death makes 
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each moment of life special because eventually all such moments must end.  Although he 
laments the end of life, Nietzsche does not necessarily fear death.17   
 However, Iqbal believed Eternal Recurrence’s primary purpose was to assuage 
Nietzsche and others’ mortality salience.  Finding no reason to fear one’s finitude, Iqbal 
references Qur’an 17:14, stating that actions in this life will ring in eternity, and that a life 
lived by the Qur’an’s virtues is a life free from the fear of death.18  Thus, where 
Nietzsche recognizes the finitude of life which makes him appreciate life, Iqbal believes 
in the immortality of the soul eliminating any fear of death.19  Iqbal’s reading of 
Nietzsche, however, leads him to conclude Nietzsche fears death, although they actually 
agreed, albeit for different reasons.   
 Three-Stage Metamorphosis of Human Development       
 Iqbal and Nietzsche believe that to progress from a mere human to insan-i kamil 
or the Übermensch one must self-actualize according to a three-stage process.  This 
process is the most noticeable similarity between Iqbal and Nietzsche’s religious 
philosophies.  The two progressions are identical in structure and process.  Iqbal’s 
follows the pattern of Faith, moving to Thought, ending with Discovery.  Nietzsche’s 
process starts with the Camel, progressing to the Lion, and ending with the Child.  These 
two self-actualization processes are also similar in the requirements for progressing from 
one stage to the next.  In addition to being unidirectional, only those who attain the final 
stages are fully actualized individuals.   
 Both processes require the individual to change his or her conception of reality in 
order to progress to the next stage.  Iqbal’s stage development is religious in nature, and 
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thus all changes in perception are rooted in profounder understandings of the Ultimate 
Reality.  The stage development process is really, then, a way to develop a more mature 
metaphysical view of life.  However, using this term in conjunction with Iqbal’s religious 
philosophy is problematic because he detested traditional metaphysics.  However, if 
metaphysics is viewed as a pursuit of Truth rather than speculative intellectual exercise, 
the term is more applicable.  Given this definition, the process is about developing action-
oriented ethics (Vital actions) grounded in deep spiritual knowledge (Intellectual 
actions).20  
 For Iqbal, this metamorphosis is also a way to refine an individual’s approach to 
religion.  The differentiating transition occurs when the insan-i kamil’s “higher Sufism” 
replaces previously held religious metaphysics21  Recalling that the goal of Sufism is a 
deeper understanding of Islam’s duties, Iqbal’s use of “higher Sufism” is deliberate.  The 
insan-i kamil’s new approach to religion profoundly alters the way the believer 
understands his or her relationship with God.  The believer understands that he or she is, 
and always has been, linked to God.  The emancipation of the individual comes not from 
the pure act of individuation, but the realization that his or her will is tied to the divine 
will.  Such a belief, however, is only alluded to by Iqbal due to sensitivities associated 
with claiming humans can directly contact God.  The execution of ecstatic Sufi al-Hallaj 
in 922 CE serves as a powerful reminder to Sufis to tread carefully when disseminating 
their beliefs.  
With this religious psychology now integrated into the insan-i kamil, he or she 
now possesses a free-will and exemplifies the argument that Iqbal is trying to make:  
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The climax of religious life, however, is the discovery of the ego as an individual deeper than his 
conceptually describable habitual self-hood.  It is in contact with the Most Real that the ego 
discovers its uniqueness, its metaphysical status, and the possibility of improvement in that 
status.22  
 
 
This new creator of values is Iqbal’s khalifah, and his or her role is to help others in the 
creation of creative egos forming the basis of Iqbal’s pluralistic view of self-
actualization.23  Curiously, Iqbal does not address the precise nature of the insan-i kamil’s 
pluralism.  One could argue that the insan-i kamil is an ideal, but not something that an 
individual could become.  Others could argue that only the Prophet Muhammad was ever 
insan-i kamil.  Still others could argue that the insan-i kamil is an independent being 
through whom higher Sufis commune with God.  Although all of these are equally 
possible interpretations, they are not equally plausible.  Within the history of Sufi 
thought, particularly that of Ibn `Arabi, there is the idea of approaching God like a moth 
approaches a flame.  However, the goal is self-annihilation, fana’, and remaining in God, 
biqa’.  Yet, the ever-present reminder of al-Hallaj often restrained Sufis in approaching 
God’s flame too closely, and this concern seemed to resonate with Iqbal.  Yet, Iqbal’s 
dislike for the “unapplied abstract,” that is to say thought for its own sake, would make 
an unattainable insan-i kamil inconsistent.  It therefore seems more likely that the insan-i 
kamil is something that is possible for all believing Muslims.  Iqbal’s stage progression 
from mere human to insan-i kamil makes it possible to see the similarities between his 
stage progression and that of Nietzsche.  
 Nietzsche’s Three Metamorphoses cast aside metaphysics entirely.  The entire 
process of development hinges on the individual stripping away all that he or she holds 
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dear.  Once this is done, the individual must then resist the emptiness this creates, and 
develop a new set of values.  This creativity destroys the old metaphysical knowledge 
and replaces it not with new metaphysical perspectives, but whatever the individual 
desires.  The process is about stripping away all that once defined the individual, 
allowing the individual to reinvent him or herself. 
  Rather than posing the development using intellectual terms, Nietzsche presents 
an allegory to describe the process to individual empowerment.  The curious aspect 
regarding Nietzsche’s Three Metamorphoses is that it gives little attention to the 
conditions which provoke the camel to develop into a lion, or what causes the lion to 
destroy the old values.  The only real discussion of conditions that necessitate a 
transformation occurs between the lion and child stages.  Nietzsche is categorically 
opposed to nihilism, and instead sought a life-affirming philosophy.  As such, a state 
which results in nihilism necessitates the creativity of a child to give life new meaning 
and purpose.          
 Recalling both Iqbal and Nietzsche’s stages of human development, a near perfect 
correlation exists between the stages required for humans to go from human being to 
insan-i kamil or the Übermensch.  Both ideas are stage-invariant, meaning one has to 
progress through each stage in order to proceed to the next stage, and emphasize 
iconoclasm.  Here the term iconoclasm is being used analogically to describe the 
destruction of society’s idols which take the form of unexamined moral codes and 
religious doctrines.  For Iqbal, a Muslim must obey, and then examine critically the 
depths of religion in order to fully understand it.  Nietzsche, on the other hand, argues the 
individual must delve deeper into the self in order to see one’s power.   
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Both paths also require the individual to experience a large amount of discomfort 
and risk to achieve perfection.  Although all humans must pass through the stages in a 
fixed order, progression is not guaranteed.  These two metamorphoses share a common 
theme in that the individual must decide to embark upon the journey toward self-
liberation.  Iqbal likely draws his inspiration from the Qur’anic verse, “Verily never will 
God change the condition of a people until they change what is within themselves.”24  
Nietzsche emphasizes individual choice in growth as the first choice in going beyond.  
However, neither of the authors fully addresses the status of those who choose to remain 
static.  What is their eschatological status?  Iqbal’s reference to the Qur’an 13:11 seems 
to answer the question for him, in that individuals who do not take the initiative to change 
will remain slaves to rules they do not understand.  Similarly, Nietzsche seems to argue 
that the only consequence for individuals who never empower themselves is that they too 
remain burdened and enslaved by forced moral standards.  Although these two conditions 
may not seem terribly punishing, to Iqbal and Nietzsche, they represent the worst 
possible existences. 
The one difference within the Three Metamorphoses and process of religious 
development is how Iqbal interprets Nietzsche’s allegory.  While he agrees overall with 
the empowerment process, Iqbal takes Nietzsche’s description literally.  Iqbal is 
impressed by the process and structure of the metamorphoses, but does not quite 
understand Nietzsche’s use of allegory in this particular instance.   
Overall, these similarities between Iqbal and Nietzsche’s three stages of 
individual development are striking and rooted in similar core beliefs.  Iqbal believes 
individuals will ultimately turn to a greater understanding of religion, and Nietzsche 
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believes that individuals will turn to a greater understanding of themselves.  Regardless, 
each author believes that his developmental stages result in a more empowered and 
unique individual.  The hypothesized reasons for these observed similarities and 
differences will be discussed in the following chapters.  
Conclusion 
 Iqbal and Nietzsche’s religious philosophies converge and diverge across several 
themes, but an important point is the simultaneous existence of similarities and 
differences within the same general concept.  This raises the question of how such a 
situation is possible.  The answer boils down to nuance.  Each thinker’s religious 
philosophy is complex, layered, and requires contextual understanding to fully 
comprehend the meaning behind their words.  Furthermore, in a transnational intellectual 
encounter, what is written in one context can be interpreted and used differently in 
another context.   
 Iqbal’s transnational intellectual encounter with Nietzsche is a case-in-point of 
such context-specific uses and interpretations.  Iqbal experienced Europe during the peak 
of its imperial domination, but when he read Nietzsche, removing Christianity from his 
society was not his concern.  Iqbal’s chief concern was with his South Asian colonial 
context, and how best to remove the British presence from South Asia.  
 Nietzsche’s religious philosophy was also context-specific insofar as he was 
writing to European Christians, and would not have imagined someone like Iqbal 
admiring his ideas.  Nietzsche’s religious philosophy’s goal was to liberate Europeans 
from decadence and cultural and artistic decline, and to Nietzsche, the concepts of culture 
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and art were equivalent to religion.  They were the highest ideals to strive for, and he was 
consumed with preventing their destruction 
 This information is provided in order to understand that Iqbal and Nietzsche can 
have both differences and similarities in their thought as a function of context and intent.  
The following chapter suggests the mechanisms of conception of religion and selective 
syncretism as responsible for Iqbal’s adoption and rejection of elements of Nietzsche’s 
religious philosophy.
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Chapter 4: Exploring Possible Causes of the Similarities and Differences 
 
 Although possible mechanisms were alluded to in the previous chapter, this 
chapter’s goal is to fully elucidate these possible mechanisms.  In line with the 
hypotheses of this thesis, the convergence and divergence between Iqbal and Nietzsche’s 
religious philosophies is primarily a function of each individual’s conception of religion.  
Delving further into what this means is a critical starting point for this chapter.  After a 
more in-depth analysis of the convergence and divergence between these religious 
philosophies, Iqbal's “selective syncretism” will be discussed at the end of this chapter.  
Factors Contributing to a Concept of Religion 
 A conception of religion is more than a mere definition; rather it is an all-
encompassing vision of what religion is and what religion’s role is for society and an 
individual.  It reflects an individual’s personal experience with and historical appraisal of 
religion, which shapes an individual’s ideas regarding religion’s function. One of the 
primary factors shaping an individual’s conception of religion is the religio-historical 
context.  Thought does not occur in a vacuum, and an individual’s conception of religion 
cannot be separated from the religio-historical context in which it is formed.  
Additionally, where intellectual exchange is encouraged, public intellectuals’ conceptions 
of religion can influence scholarly conceptions of religion.  This point is important 
because although Nietzsche’s impact on European public conceptions of religion was 
negligible, his impact within the scholarly community that Iqbal was a part of was 
observable.  Conceptions of religion can be reactionary, forward-thinking, supportive, 
critical, or any combination of these adjectives with regard to the contemporary 
understanding of religion.  What is critical is placing conceptions of religion within an 
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individual’s religio-historical context to help explain why some aspects of religion are 
emphasized more than others.     
Iqbal’s Conception of Religion 
 Iqbal’s conception of religion was the sum total of an individual’s being.1   His 
all-encompassing view of religion may appear to smother other aspects of identity, but 
instead his view is that religion permeates and informs all aspects of an individual’s 
identity.  The purpose of din (literally “judgment” translated as religion) is to provide 
individuals with the appropriate moral framework to fulfill God’s amanah (“trust”) and 
be a faithful khalifah (“steward”) of the earth.  It constitutes a transformative structure 
and process that motivates and guides believers in fulfillment of the responsibilities of 
achieving social justice imposed by religion.2  Such a process and striving for social 
justice, necessarily empowers the individual.  It is not meant to assuage one’s fear of 
death despite providing such comfort.  The purpose of religion for the larger society is 
merely that of the individual at the aggregate level.  If each individual undergoes the 
transformative process, then individual actions are morally grounded and the collective 
morality naturally manifests social justice.   
 Concerning religion’s origin, Iqbal assumes the ontological argument:  that higher 
than which nothing can exist, must exist   Iqbal, as a committed Muslim, believes in the 
innate ability to recognize the existence of the divine based on the Qur’an’s description of 
religion as a divine ordinate from God.3  However, he is not a literalist, and views the 
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Qur’an’s description of God’s ruh (“life-giving spirit”)4 as a metaphor for the ontological 
arguments for religion and God.  Although Iqbal does not say religion is required for 
belief in God, his argument implicitly questions the value of believing in God without 
religion to structure and ground such belief.  Failure to believe in God contradicts 
human’s fitra (“nature”) and prevents the striving for social justice.  Thus, to Iqbal, 
atheism’s denial of God is equivalent to denying justice, and therefore prevents the 
creation of a just society.     
 Iqbal was a Sufi-influenced Sunni Muslim, but the subcontinent’s religious and 
intellectual diversity exposed him to different ideas regarding religion.  After the various 
religious and intellectual ideas around him, the most important factor in Iqbal’s 
understanding of Islam is Muslim life under British colonial rule.  After Muslims ruled 
the subcontinent for centuries as a minority group, the humiliation of colonization 
clarifies Iqbal’s passion for justice and empowerment.  Channeling this passion into 
nationalist activism, Iqbal led the Muslim League as president beginning in 1930.5  This 
movement’s principles were based in the idea that Islam was morally, socially, and 
politically empowering.  The other major nationalist movement, the Indian National 
Congress, included many prominent Indian Muslims, but stressed the subcontinent’s 
diversity.  Although a believer in Indian nationalism, Iqbal was committed to achieving 
justice for Muslims, and contextualizing his religious conception within the nationalist 
struggle elucidates his call to empowerment.    
Nietzsche’s Conception of Religion 
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 Nietzsche understands religion as a constructed experiential value system to guide 
one’s life, and often serves a secondary function of social control.  This belief that 
religion plays a negative role in the lives of both individuals and society stems from his 
appraisal of institutionalized religion as historically oppressive when charged with 
determining everyone’s morality.  Such a public role is inimical to the individual’s 
empowerment and development in changing circumstances.  Furthermore, Nietzsche 
advocated the removal of religion from the individual’s life.  He argues religious value 
systems, oriented toward pleasing some externality, quash the individual’s spirit for the 
“greater good,” fear of divine punishment, or rewards in the hereafter. 
 Regardless of the religion in question, Nietzsche believes that all religions are 
human constructs that parallel human evolution.  “Primitive” religions were early human 
constructs to provide comfort in the face of a bleak existence.  As humans began to 
master their environment, polytheistic religions developed in which humans imparted 
ideal values upon “gods.”  Humans eventually replaced polytheism with monotheism by 
endowing a singular divine entity with both human ideals and the power to regulate all 
temporal and spiritual activity.  According to this evolutionary approach, Nietzsche 
believes religion’s origins reflect advances in human development, mastery over the 
environment, and heightened mortality concerns.   
 Finally, Nietzsche’s European Christian context shaped his conception of religion.   
Specifically, his upbringing in the Lutheran Pietism movement taught him religion not as 
a set of doctrines, but as an experience.  Religion was something an individual practiced 
and experienced, and not an intellectual exercise.  Nietzsche’s overall context was one in 
which religion was expected to permeate society and even guide governance and laws.  
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This made Nietzsche an iconoclast, who provided a bold and radical understanding of 
religion concurrent with other critics, but also ahead of its time.   
Similarities and Differences in Religious Conceptions 
 The nature of religion is rooted in both its perceived origins and its functional 
appraisal as a positive or negative value system.  Two basic distinctions regarding the 
origins of religion are divine and non-divine.  If a religion is divine in origin, then it 
flows from whatever transcendent reality referenced by the religion.  Conversely, if a 
religion is non-divine in origin, then it is a human construction designed for some 
purpose.  One’s perspective on religion’s origins often indirectly impacts one’s appraisal 
of its functionality.  Additionally, one’s individual and historical experience with religion 
shapes one’s appraisal of its function.  Categorically different, individual religious 
experience is an encounter with one’s transcendent reality whereas historical experience 
with religion reflects communal experiences with religious institutions.    
 Iqbal does not offer proofs of God’s existence, but accepts the Qur’anic 
assumption of an innate recognition (fitra) of God.  He expands the idea of fitra to 
include religion, and by connecting fitra and religion argues that religion is not only 
divine, but the only way to appropriately respond to God.  Religion’s function, then, is to 
provide the necessary moral structure and transformative process to approach God, 
thereby approximating God’s attributes and achieving empowerment.  Religion, then, is 
inherently beneficial and empowering for humans.  Other responses, such as atheism, 
pervert fitra and prevent the individual from approaching God and achieving 
empowerment.   
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 Nietzsche, however, argues religion is non-divine and places it alongside other 
human constructs within evolutionary history.  This view is consonant with nineteenth 
century secularist thought, and heavily influenced by the growing popularity of 
Darwinian evolution.  Religion’s evolutionary function is to assuage the fear of mortality 
and create social order through moral law by claiming transcendent origins for such law.  
Influencing Nietzsche’s view is the European historical experience of monarchical 
despotism justified through religion.  Keeping with the evolutionary perspective, 
Nietzsche argues that human advances in science and social and political organization 
make religion’s comforts and control obsolete, and even maladaptive when applied to 
contexts that do not require religion’s socio-political hierarchies and explanations of 
natural phenomena.   
 Also featured prominently in Iqbal and Nietzsche’s conceptions of religion is the 
impact religion has on the individual.  Islam and Christianity both claim to existentially 
impact individuals by providing a set of morals and worldview.  The metric each religion 
uses to assess a change in belief is the individual’s behavior.  However, the exact process 
in which this change in beliefs occurs is both a unifying and divisive point between 
Iqbal’s and Nietzsche’s conception of religion.   
 Reflecting their modernist views, they advocate the need for the individual to 
answer existential questions rather than institutions or doctrines.  Therefore, both 
religious philosophers seek to empower the individual so that individuals feel capable of 
navigating existential questions without institutional dogma.  Stemming from this belief 
in individual agency is the emphasis on experience.  Drawing upon their respective Sufi 
and Pietist backgrounds, they believe in the primacy of emotional religious experience.  
 - 98 - 
To clarify, both Iqbal and Nietzsche reject institutionalized religion, albeit for different 
reasons, and argue instead for allowing individuals to experience some form of 
transcendence. 
 In Iqbal’s case, self-transcendence is communion with God provided by religion.  
Nietzsche’s self-transcendence is going beyond what one currently is and becoming what 
one desires to be.  Both of these paradigms shun intellectualized religion promoted by 
institutions, and argue for transformative, emotive, and empowering attempts at self-
transcendence.  Iqbal argues religion is ideal for self-transcendence through communion 
with God, while Nietzsche regards all religion, personal and institutional, as equally 
detrimental to self-transcendence.  However, a commonality is their belief that the drive 
for transcendence leads to action.  For Iqbal, this idea is rooted in the Qur’an, “Allah does 
not change people’s lot unless they change what is in their hearts,”6 and for Nietzsche, 
“So faith by itself, if it has no works, is dead.”7  Thus, intellectual belief without action 
inspired by such belief is insufficient to empower an individual.  The critical link to 
empowerment they both share is that deeds reflect what an individual truly believes, and 
as such argue for idiosyncratic value systems to drive individuals to actively pursue their 
goals.   
 Another prominent aspect of their conceptions of religion is religion’s impact on 
society.  As an encompassing system, religion impacts society by attempting to regulate 
individual moral behavior and worldviews.  Within the discussion of Iqbal and Nietzsche, 
their respective contexts are critical to understanding their views on the social impact of 
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religion.  Furthermore, within this aspect of their conception of religion, their broader 
goals for their society are apparent. 
 Iqbal believed the societal purpose of religion was to create a just society.  To 
Iqbal, society is a collection of individuals, and religion’s function of providing each 
individual access to God is a positive force for society.  The pursuit of social justice, 
then, is not something dictated by a central authority, but a collective of religiously 
empowered individuals.  Within his South Asian context, Iqbal was a religio-political 
reformer reconstructing Islam as an empowering religion to remove British colonization 
from the subcontinent.  Thus, religion’s impact on society is inherently political, which is 
reflected in his focus on the value of Islam’s empowering qualities to the nationalist 
struggle.    
 Nietzsche regards religion’s societal impact as creating stagnation and 
complacency.  As he sees it, the values within religions are fixed, and stifle individually 
empowering pursuits, such as art, and crush any changes in cultural norms.  It is because 
of this overwhelming negative impact on society that Nietzsche advocates its complete 
removal.  Yet, he sees religion as a potentially useful obstacle for individual growth 
insofar as the process of removing religion is difficult, but beneficial for individual 
sovereignty.  Nietzsche’s admittedly unrealistic ideal is to aggregate this self-
transcendence to the broader society to create a dynamic, empowered society.  Similar to 
Iqbal’s use of religion to further his political agenda, Nietzsche’s desire to remove 
religion to improve society makes him a moralist whose goal is to cause Europeans to 
follow Nietzsche and re-value all the values they take for granted.   
From Conception to Religious Philosophy 
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 The previous analysis shows Iqbal and Nietzsche’s religious philosophies 
converging along three emphases: the individual, experience, and action.  Each of these 
emphases carries over into their religious philosophies, giving rise to their convergent 
individualistic ideas.  Additionally, they differ along three emphases: origin, function, 
and contextual purpose.  These differences in conception influenced Iqbal and 
Nietzsche’s ideas on how to attain the individual empowerment they both desired.  
Convinced of the existence of God, Iqbal was committed to demonstrating Islam’s 
empowering qualities.  Disenchanted with religion, Nietzsche was determined to expose 
it as a system hindering individual’s empowerment. 
Selective Syncretism as a Possible Mechanism 
 A concurrent mechanism to conceptions of religion that explains the observed 
similarities and differences between Iqbal’s and Nietzsche’s religious philosophy is 
selective syncretism.  Selective syncretism is the process by which Iqbal was able to 
incorporate aspects of European philosophy he felt compatible with and useful to his 
South Asian context, and reject ideas either incompatible or not useful.  This way, Iqbal 
remains original, but leaves the fingerprints of European thought on his work.  However, 
simply because an idea is compatible with Islam, or useful for his anti-colonial goals, 
does not mean that Iqbal syncretizes it into his religious philosophy.  Unique to Iqbal was 
his work in a mostly illiterate, traditional South Asian Muslim context, sensitive to 
matters regarding their religion.  It would be useless for Iqbal to draft a religious 
philosophy so offensive that South Asian Muslims refuse to make it their own.  Thus, on 
a practical level, selective syncretism helped Iqbal walk the fine line between being 
faithful to the goal of liberation and staying true to Islam  
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 Examples of selective syncretism are Iqbal’s use of insan-i kamil for Nietzsche’s 
Übermensch.  The syncretism worked because enough overlap existed between the insan-
i kamil and the Übermensch such that Iqbal could syncretize aspects of the Übermensch 
to fit his context.  Another example is the use of the world “self” or “individual.”  Iqbal 
saw the words “self” and “ego” in Nietzsche’s works as similar to khud/khudi, which 
would resonate better with South Asian Muslims.  A relevant example of a difference 
based on selective syncretism is Iqbal’s outright rejection of Eternal Recurrence as 
incompatible with the Islamic view of life and afterlife.  As such, incorporating Eternal 
Recurrence into his religious philosophy would have been ineffective and possibly 
detrimental to his goal of propagating his empowerment message.  
 Providing these brief examples makes it possible to see that Iqbal’s and 
Nietzsche’s similarities and differences also occurred via selective syncretism.  Again, 
this thesis does not declare that this particular mechanism can explain the entire variance 
between the religious philosophies, but that it can be useful in explaining portions.  It is 
also an important point that challenges two existing camps within Iqbal scholarship.   
  
 One camp believes Iqbal plagiarized Nietzsche by translating his philosophy into 
Urdu and Persian.8  The failure of this reductionist position is that it cannot account for 
the explicit rejections Iqbal makes regarding aspects of Nietzsche’s religious philosophy.  
Furthermore, it seems to suggest that a South Asian Muslim could not devise a religious 
philosophy centered on individual empowerment, claiming these values are not part of 
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Islamo-Confucian Eastern culture.  To some extent it is true that “Eastern” societies tend 
to be more collectivist, but this West-East binary should not preclude scholars from 
giving credit where it is due.  It should also not preclude scholars from failing to 
recognize intellectual diversity in societies.   
 The other camp believes that as a devout Muslim, Iqbal would never associate 
himself or his religious philosophy with the “Great Atheist” Nietzsche.9  This camp 
explains the similarities as purely coincidental, and highlights the differences to bolster 
their position.  This too is a reductionist position, and also assumes a West-East binary 
that fails to recognize intellectual diversity.  The solution to these two extremes, shared 
by other scholars such as Roy Jackson, is that of selective syncretism.  In fact, Roy 
Jackson describes the selective syncretic approach in his book Nietzsche and Islam 
without using the term: 
 It is unfair, and inaccurate, to state that Iqbal derived his whole philosophy from  Nietzsche, but 
nor is it  correct to say that there is no influence at all! …It is more accurate to say that Iqbal used his 
extensive  knowledge of Western—and especially German—thought to incorporate it with his 
knowledge of Islam.10  
   
This is precisely how the selective syncretist approach views Iqbal and Nietzsche’s 
transcultural intellectual exchange. 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has shown the various similarities and differences within Iqbal and 
Nietzsche’s actual concepts of religion.  These similarities and differences were then 
applied to the observed similarities and differences in their religious philosophies with 
brief explanations as to how the differences in conceptions of religion accounted for the 
                                                 
9
 See chapters 5, 6, 16 in Hafeez Malik (ed.), Iqbal: Poet-Philosopher of Pakistan (New York, London: 
Columbia University Press, 1971); Roy Jackson, Nietzsche and Islam, 62-63.  Similarly, these chapters tend 
to overemphasize Iqbal’s differences with Nietzsche and fail to capture the full extent of Iqbal’s encounter 
and admiration of Nietzsche.   
10
 Roy Jackson, Nietzsche and Islam, 63. 
 - 103 - 
differences in religious philosophy.  Finally, this chapter concluded with a discussion of 
selective syncretism as a second mechanism explaining Iqbal’s and Nietzsche’s 
similarities and differences.  These mechanisms are not definitive, but instead persuasive 
because it is difficult to imagine that context and education could account for all of the 
observed similarities and differences.  It is at this point where the similarities and 
differences in conceptions of religion and selective syncretism play their roles.  They fill 
the voids where context and education cannot explain how two different individuals 
living in two different time periods who never met developed both highly convergent and 
divergent religious philosophies.   
 Each of these individuals developed his religious philosophy with preconceived 
conceptions of religion.  Nietzsche read other philosophy with this conception of religion 
in mind, and subsequently developed his religious philosophy based on his 
understandings of other religious philosophers.  When Iqbal read Nietzsche, the same 
event occurred.  Iqbal brought a particular conception of religion with him to his reading 
of Nietzsche, which influenced his agreement and disagreement with Nietzsche’s 
arguments.  It is in this way that both similar and differing conceptions of religion and 
selective syncretism work in tandem.  Only that which can pass the conception of religion 
and goal-utility filters is included in the final religious philosophy.  In the final chapter, 
the very concrete aspects of how Iqbal read and understood Nietzsche will be discussed 
to understand whether the idea of similar and differing conceptions of religion and 
selective syncretism were purposeful, or coincidental.  
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Chapter 5: Understanding Iqbal’s Understanding of Nietzsche 
 
 This final section discusses the details of Iqbal’s encounter with Nietzsche and 
how he understood Nietzsche.  The chapter will then move to a discussion of the 
instances in which Iqbal expresses admiration for Nietzsche, as well as ridicule, and offer 
possible explanations as to why this might occur.  The ultimate goal of this chapter is to 
further contextualize Iqbal’s encounter with Nietzsche, and probe Iqbal’s competency 
regarding his reading, comprehension, and application of Nietzsche’s ideas.   
Evaluating Iqbal’s Encounter with Nietzsche 
 Given Iqbal’s general contextual encounter with Nietzsche in turn-of-the-century 
Munich and Heidelberg, it is necessary to investigate further this cross-cultural and 
linguistically challenging encounter.  Helpful questions are: How well did Iqbal 
understand Nietzsche?  Did Iqbal understand sarcasm, cultural references, and poetic 
style in German?  Did Iqbal recognize the audience Nietzsche was addressing?  Did Iqbal 
read Nietzsche in translation?  How did perceptions of public and private religion impact 
Iqbal’s understanding of Nietzsche?  How did context affect this transnational and 
transcultural intellectual encounter (i.e. Iqbal is in a Muslim, South Asian, colonized 
context.  Nietzsche is in a Christian, European, colonizing context)? 
 It is likely that Iqbal was research-proficient in German, owing to the various 
German references throughout his Ph.D. dissertation conducted at the Ludwig-
Maxmilians Unversität in Munich.1  Furthermore, his doktorvater, “dissertation adviser,” 
was the German Orientalist Friedrich “Fritz” Hommel, and it seems more likely that Iqbal 
had to know German rather than Hommel had to know English.  However, without 
                                                 
1
 Muhammad Iqbal, “The Development of Metaphysics in Persia” (PhD dissertation, Ludwig-Maxmilians 
Universität, 1908). http://www.allamaiqbal.com. Throughout his dissertation, Iqbal references research in 
German in his footnotes. 
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primary source documents, this is at most educated conjecture.  There are primary source 
documents discussed by Dr. M. A. H. Hobohm indicating Iqbal had a relationship with a 
female German tutor in Heidelberg named Emma Wegenast.2  Dr. Hobohm states that the 
relationship was not romantic based on the content of their letter correspondence.  
However, Iqbal was fond of her, and laments his lack of ability in German, to which Dr. 
Hobohm says “Iqbal…is much too modest.”3  Given his training at the Ludwig-
Maximilians Unversität, citation of German research in his dissertation, and his 
correspondence with Miss Wegenast in German, it would seem that Iqbal had a decent 
command of German.   
    However, understanding research articles and correspondence in German is 
different from Nietzsche’s stylistic German.  Walter Kaufmann, one of the more notable 
Nietzsche translators and scholars, states, “Nietzsche’s books are easier to read but harder 
to understand than those of almost any other thinker…the individual sentences seem clear 
enough…it is the total design that puzzles us.”4   Given this, it is necessary to question 
whether Iqbal understood “the individual sentences” or the “total design.”5  
Unfortunately, scholars are left with only Iqbal’s references to Nietzsche as indications of 
his understanding Nietzsche.  Based on these indications, and the similarities and 
differences due to selective syncretism, Iqbal seemed to understand a great deal.  Yet, 
when one reads some of Iqbal’s ridicules of Nietzsche, it appears that he did not grasp the 
                                                 
2
 M. A. H. Hobohm, “Muhammad Iqbal and German: A Correspondence of the Heart,” in Iqbal Review: 
Journal of the Iqbal Academy Pakistan 41, 4 (October 2000), http://www.allamaiqbal.com/. 
3
 Ibid. 
4
 Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, 4th ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1974), 72. 
5
 Ibid. 
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entirety of Nietzsche’s points.  As Kaufmann makes clear, however, it is difficult to claim 
one knows what Nietzsche meant.   
 Further questions regarding Iqbal’s understanding relate to the High German, and 
varying styles employed by Nietzsche.  He often makes his point through sarcasm, 
poetry, or German cultural references familiar to Germans, but perhaps not to non-
Germans.  Furthermore, Nietzsche’s use of “monadologic” (self-sufficient aphorisms 
which can both stand on their own, but are connected to other aphorisms) make his 
thought that much harder to follow.6  This leads Kaufmann to say, “No half systematic 
anthology of sundry opinions can tell us ‘what Nietzsche means’—either in the sense of 
his intentions or in the sense of his significance for us.”7  Nietzsche’s varying styles and 
seemingly disjointed aphorisms are challenging for educated Germans.  How much more 
so then for Iqbal?    The point of this section is not to claim that Iqbal was ignorant of 
Nietzsche’s intended meanings, but to ask relevant questions regarding Iqbal’s 
understanding of Nietzsche.  It is therefore possible that some of the observed similarities 
and differences are due to chance by linguistic error, and not the similarities and 
differences in conception of religion and selective syncretism.  However, this assertion 
fails the scholarly test of parsimony by assuming too much of Iqbal’s understanding was 
chance or error. 
 Another related question is whether Iqbal was aware of the audience to whom 
Nietzsche was writing.  Nietzsche was not writing to South Asian, Muslim, colonized 
individuals like Iqbal.  Rather, Nietzsche was writing to the upper class, educated, 
religious and secular circles of nineteenth century Europe.  Additionally, he was writing 
                                                 
6
 Ibid., 75. 
7
 Ibid., 76. 
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to an audience experiencing the turmoil of German unification and a redrawing of the 
European geo-political map.  Failing to understand Nietzsche’s audience, and recognizing 
it did not include individuals like Iqbal is a mistake.  The question then is whether Iqbal 
was cognizant of Nietzsche’s target audience?  The answer is again speculative, but likely 
yes.  The principle of selective syncretism can help explain this problem, by suggesting 
Iqbal parsed out aspects of Nietzsche’s religious philosophy that he knew would be 
acceptable in his context.  By avoiding those aspects which would not translate cross-
culturally, it seems that Iqbal recognized where Nietzsche was speaking to humans in 
general, or to Europeans, and “Germans” specifically.   
 The final question related to Iqbal’s linguistic encounter is whether he read 
Nietzsche in translation.  This is another question lacking a definitive answer, but it 
appears the answer is no.  The reasoning for such an answer is that Iqbal likely 
encountered Nietzsche in Germany, and the likelihood of English translations of 
Nietzsche in Germany at that time is slim.  Furthermore, it is unlikely Iqbal read 
Nietzsche in the United Kingdom, given a general animosity among British philosophers 
toward Nietzsche because of his statements regarding the “English.”  Additionally, 
British philosophy during Iqbal’s time was moving toward Analytical Philosophy and 
away from the more metaphysical religious and philosophical pursuits of continental 
Europe.   
 A method to determine whether Iqbal read Nietzsche in translation is to cross-
check his quotes of Nietzsche to see if he is directly quoting or paraphrasing.  In one 
instance, Iqbal quotes Nietzsche in The Gay Science as saying nationalism is “sickness 
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and unreason” and “the strongest force against culture.”8  If one compares these 
translations with Thomas Common’s 1924 translation of The Gay Science, one notices he 
is paraphrasing, and references the full quote in his endnotes.  One is then left with two 
choices regarding Iqbal’s quotation of Nietzsche.  The first option is he read Nietzsche in 
translation and deliberately chose not to fully quote a translated English passage for an 
English lecture series.  The second is he paraphrased the quotations because he knew the 
original German, but could not expect his audience to have a full command of both 
English and German.  Of these two options, it seems that the second is more plausible, 
supporting the claim that Iqbal read Nietzsche in German.   
 It is also appropriate to ask if Iqbal’s reading of Nietzsche was affected by 
differing conceptions of public and private religion, univocal vs. multivocal uses of the 
word religion, and the differences between the word “religion” and the word “din” 
(Arabic/Islamic word for “Judgment” but often translated as religion).  To the first 
question, it seems that there were tensions between Nietzsche’s more private conception 
of religion and Iqbal’s more public conception of religion.  These tensions stem from 
Iqbal’s belief that religion’s role was improving the individual and society through 
individuals.  Nietzsche’s general belief was that although religion ideally empowers 
people history does not support this belief and led him to abandon the religious 
empowerment paradigm.  To facilitate this, he promoted the privatization of religion and 
the secularization of society, in line with Secularization Hypothesis.  This point proved 
contentious because it pitted Iqbal’s Muslim beliefs against Nietzsche’s secularism.  In 
                                                 
8
 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), 339; 
Muhammad Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, 1934, 86. 
http://www.allamaiqbal.com/. 
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the end, it appears Iqbal’s belief in the public role for religion was unshaken, and may 
have resulted in some of Iqbal’s disagreements with Nietzsche.   
 The second part of this question concerns the differences between Iqbal and 
Nietzsche’s differing vocalities (multi-vocal and univocal) of the word religion.  
Multivocal and univocal simply mean the degree of latitude that the author uses a word, 
in this case religion.  Due to Iqbal’s broad understanding of what religion is, his usage of 
the word is multivocal, in that it can be applied to many different, often non-traditional, 
situations.  Nietzsche’s use is univocal, owing to his philologist’s training in the precise 
use of words.  When Iqbal uses the word religion, it is important to understand his 
context.  When Nietzsche uses religion, context is important, but he has more consistent, 
narrow meaning for the word.  Additionally, Iqbal was using a multi-vocal word across 
languages, using “religion” in English, and din in Persian and Urdu.  This creates 
additional complexities because these two terms are not entirely equivalent.  A religio-
philosophical and linguistic bias was part of both authors’ writings, and a bias Iqbal 
brought to his readings of Nietzsche.  Iqbal’s bias in the context of his encounter with 
Nietzsche could explain some of the variance between Iqbal and Nietzsche’s religious 
philosophies.   
 The final part of this question deals with the meanings of the word religion.  A 
rough etymological translation of the word “religion” likely comes from the Latin 
“religare” meaning “to bind” indicating there is a link between humans and something 
else (i.e. the divine).  The word din means “judgment” implying there is a judge, a 
recipient, and criteria for such judgment.  These two words have different meanings, but 
are often translated as equivalents.  The word “religion” is more appropriate to the 
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European Christian context which emphasizes the individual’s commitments to the divine 
through belief.  The word din is more suited to Iqbal’s belief that one’s actions are more 
important than one’s doctrinal beliefs.  Two important questions are: what meaning did 
Iqbal associate with Nietzsche’s use of the word “religion,” (i.e. Latinate, or Islamo-
Arabic din) and if he used these terms interchangeably in his own writings.  Iqbal was 
clever enough to notice the difference, but it is possible that this confusion of terms could 
explain some of the variance in religious philosophies.   
  Finally, it is appropriate to ask whether the differences in contexts significantly 
affected Iqbal’s reading of Nietzsche.  Iqbal was anti-colonial, but benefited greatly from 
the colonial education systems and had a great deal of admiration for Europe.  However, 
there is little doubt that he disliked the European colonial presence in South Asia.  The 
question, then, is whether Iqbal’s anti-colonial feelings interfered with his reading of 
European writers, such as Nietzsche. 
 It is possible that two equally valid answers exist for this question.  The first is the 
answer for Iqbal the Scholar, who is capable of setting aside his emotions to evaluate as 
objectively as possible the ideas in front of him.  Given Iqbal’s interest and early 
exposure to Western European philosophy through his British secular education, this 
seems plausible.  Two examples showing Iqbal the Scholar are The Reconstruction of 
Religious Thought in Islam and his poem Payam-i Mashriq (A Message from the East).  
In these two works, one religio-philosophical and one poetic, Iqbal evaluates and drafts 
religious-philosophy, and reconciles the “East-West” divide in versified communication.  
However, the second answer deals with Iqbal the Nationalist Poet, who did not set aside 
personal feelings about European colonization when evaluating European ideas.  In his 
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poem Zarb-i Kalim (The Rod of Moses), Iqbal rails against Western European decadence 
and the negative effects of foreign domination, appealing to the emotions felt by many 
under colonialism.  In this second case, Iqbal was not rationally evaluating European 
thought, but decrying Europe as a monolithic, colonizing entity.  Perhaps he did this for 
the sake of his message’s appeal (i.e. contradicting his own thoughts, but agreeing with 
the thoughts of others), or perhaps it was his genuine emotional reaction.  In the end, it is 
likely that both of these explanations are appropriate, and that Iqbal’s evaluation of 
European thought depended on his personal emotional context, and his audience.   
 This begs an interesting question that asks if Iqbal was Machiavellian, or whether 
his thought was organically dynamic.  For many in South Asia, Iqbal was inspiring, and 
not a manipulator.  However, from a scholarly perspective, one could argue Iqbal adapted 
his thought based on his audience to make his message more effective.  Given the low 
levels of literacy at the time, it would have been difficult for others to identify 
inconsistencies.  Ultimately, this is speculative because Iqbal never wrote an 
autobiography, leaving scholars only with words requiring interpretation.   
 
 
Instances of Praise for Nietzsche 
  Instead of giving multiple instances of Iqbal’s praise for Nietzsche, this section 
will provide a singular, illustrative example.  Coming from Javid Nama, Iqbal devotes a 
full 73 line section to Nietzsche entitled “Beyond the Spheres: The Station of the German 
Philosopher Nietzsche.”9  Iqbal acting as the narrator introduces a man described as 
                                                 
9
 Muhammad Iqbal, Javid Nama, trans. A. J. Arberry (1966), 1932, 71-73. http://www.allamaiqbal.com/. 
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having “a voice full of agony… vision keener than an eagle’s.”10  Within the poem, the 
narrator asks Rumi who is this “madman,”11 (possibly referencing Nietzsche’s madman 
section in The Gay Science which declares “God is dead”12) that denies Gabriel, Paradise, 
houris (nymphs of Paradise), and God repeatedly?  Rumi responds: “…the German 
genius… Hallaj without gallows and rope.”13  This reference to Hallaj is an important 
honorific among Sufis because Hallaj was executed for his statement “Ana al-Haqq” (“I 
am the Truth” but using one of the ninety-nine names God, thereby calling himself God). 
The comparison to Nietzsche pays homage to the extreme statements he made to a 
society that does not fully understand them.  Iqbal also praises Nietzsche’s thoughts as 
“sublime,”14 and further describes him as someone who sought truth more than his 
contemporaries, leaving him utterly alone in his search.  Iqbal even goes so far as to 
compare him to Moses.15  This description paints Nietzsche as a tortured soul that a 
reader empathizes with and wants him to achieve his goal and end his anguish.    
 Although there are melancholy tones which could be construed as criticism, the 
overall tone of the passage is one of admiration.  These melancholic instances, however, 
suggest a sadness that can only come from deep respect for an individual.  The clues that 
lead to this conclusion are the ways in which Iqbal praises, which are contrasted to the 
ways he criticizes, covered in the next section.  The most important clue regarding Iqbal’s 
admiration is who actually praises Nietzsche.  In the previous passage, he used Rumi, 
who would have been well-known to all who read or heard Javid Nama.  Another 
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 Ibid., 72. 
11
 Ibid. 
12
 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 181-182. 
13
 Iqbal, Javid Nama, 72. 
14
 Ibid. 
15
 Ibid., 73. 
 - 113 - 
important clue pertaining to the sincerity of Iqbal’s praise is his comparison of Nietzsche 
to Hallaj and Moses.  These references seem calculated because Hallaj and Moses would 
hold great appeal among Sufi and non-Sufi Muslims respectively.  Particularly flattering 
is Iqbal’s comparison of Nietzsche to Moses, which gives Nietzsche and his “revelations” 
a status akin to Mosaic Law.  A final clue is Iqbal’s repetition of positive adjectives 
common in Persianate poetry which uses such hyperbole to reinforce specific points. 
 An additional point to consider is why Iqbal would make poetic references to 
Nietzsche at all.  Noted earlier, Iqbal often used poetry for mass appeal, and the mostly 
illiterate masses in British India would not have known who Nietzsche was.  Yet, Iqbal 
references him anyway, which begs the question of why.  On one level, he is making a 
functional reference for the educated audiences.  On another level, he is introducing an 
unknown individual praised by individuals familiar to the audience.  It is possible that he 
deliberately connected his ideas with Nietzsche to earn the respect of educated listeners, 
and to also gain support from the uneducated by having well-known figures praise 
Nietzsche, and therefore, his ideas.   Iqbal’s praise then is both personal and strategic for 
spreading his message.  
 A final point to consider is whether Iqbal praised Nietzsche more during certain 
periods of his life compared to other periods.  Using a timeline of his active years, his 
first instance of praise occurs in Payam-i Mashriq (1923),16 followed by a second 
instance in the aforementioned Javid Nama (1932),17 and his last instance of praise in The 
Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam (1931, 1934).18  The timeline for these 
                                                 
16
 Muhammad Iqbal, A Message from the East, trans. M. Hadi Hussain (1977), 1923, 53-55. 
http://www.allamaiqbal.com/. Iqbal makes 3 positive mentions of Nietzsche. 
17
 Iqbal, Javid Nama, 71-73. Iqbal makes 1 lengthy positive mention of Nietzsche. 
18
 Iqbal, Reconstruction, 86. Iqbal makes 1 brief positive mention of Nietzsche. 
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poems, both in Persian, seems to indicate a consistency in Iqbal’s admiration across his 
active years.   
Instances of Ridicule/Criticism 
 To adequately demonstrate Iqbal’s criticisms of Nietzsche both an example of 
versified and prose criticism will be used.  Zarb-i Kalim provides useful versified 
example of Iqbal’s critical tone toward Nietzsche.  The content of this criticism is 
somewhat similar to Javid Nama, but the overall tone of the passage is harsh.  Two 
poignant selections from Zarb-i Kalim are: 
 The subtle point that God is one, 
 The German sage could not perceive: 
 Clear sight and mind are both a must, 
 So that this point one may conceive.19  
 
Followed by: 
 
 Although his natural bent of mind 
 From stains and blemish is quite free; 
 His soul this dormant fact betrays 
 He yearns for life replete with spree.20  
 
In the first passage, Iqbal uses sarcasm to criticize Nietzsche by juxtaposing him as the 
“German sage” and being unable to perceive the “subtle point” of God’s unity.21  To 
Iqbal and Muslim listeners, the central tenet of tawhid (“oneness of God”) is obvious to 
all who observe their surroundings with “clear sight and mind.”22  The second passage 
criticizes Nietzsche’s materialism and singular focus on humans, and his emptiness by 
rejecting the divine.  Iqbal poetically states that Nietzsche’s mind, like that of all humans, 
                                                 
19
 Muhammad Iqbal, The Rod of Moses: A Declaration of War Against the Present Age, trans. V. G. 
Kiernan, 1936, 19. http://www.allamaiqbal.com/.  
20
 Ibid. 
21
 Ibid. 
22
 Ibid. 
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is naturally bent toward God and blemish free, but longing for materialism, Nietzsche 
ruins his good nature.   
 The prose criticism comes from The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam 
with one particular moment standing out from the rest.  In this section, Iqbal is discussing 
psychology’s and biology’s inability to understand religion and religious life through the 
scientific method.23  He chides scientific analysis of religious sexual imagery and rejects 
defense mechanism hypotheses for the development of religion.24  He then makes a 
statement which leads into his discussion of Nietzsche: 
 …if the science of psychology is ever likely to possess a real significance for the life of mankind, 
it must  develop an independent method calculated to discover a new technique  better suited to the temper 
of our  times.  Perhaps a psychopath endowed with a great intellect—the combination is not an 
impossibility— may give us a clue to such a technique.  In modern Europe, Nietzsche…25  
 
Here, Iqbal labels Nietzsche a “psychopath endowed with a great intellect,”26 which is 
not a flattering description.  Iqbal also states Nietzsche received a prophetic vision 
(perhaps alluding to Thus Spake Zarathustra’s “Of the Vision and the Riddle”), but 
concludes, “…Nietzsche was a failure; and his failure was mainly due to his intellectual 
progenitors such as Schopenhauer, Darwin, and Lange whose influence completely 
blinded him to the real significance of his vision.”27  Iqbal further ridicules Nietzsche for 
his desire for an oligarchy of Übermenschen, and lack of interest in cultivating the divine 
in “the plebeian.”28  Finally, Iqbal concludes his ridicule of Nietzsche by characterizing 
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 Iqbal, Reconstruction, 88. 
24
 Ibid. 
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 Ibid., 89. 
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 Ibid. 
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 Ibid. 
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him as a hypocrite who publicly claimed to not need spirituality, but privately was “fully 
conscious of his own spiritual need.”29 
 It is easy to see Iqbal delivers sharp criticism to Nietzsche’s thoughts and ideas, 
and skirts ad hominem attacks.  In earlier instances in The Reconstruction of Religious 
Thought in Islam, Iqbal had scholarly disagreements with some of Nietzsche’s 
conclusions, but did not label him a failure.  In this example, however, Iqbal’s pity for 
Nietzsche is demeaning and pejorative.     
 Similarly, Iqbal’s leaves clues for the reader to recognize when he is being 
critical.  In these two instances, one can detect his intent to criticize through his tone, his 
religio-cultural references, and the ad hominem quality of his statements.  In both the 
poetic and prose statements one senses a disdain for Nietzsche’s ideas, and on some level 
for Nietzsche himself.  The sharp tone and terse statements stand in stark contrast to 
Iqbal’s lengthy, hyperbolic admiring statements.  Second, the religio-cultural references 
regarding God’s existence would have been a powerful criticism in light of his audience.  
Finally, the ad hominem character of Iqbal’s prose ridicule is uncharacteristic of Iqbal, 
but nonetheless an expression of his disagreements with Nietzsche.  A final note 
regarding these criticisms is that this thesis does not claim Nietzsche’s thoughts and ideas 
are immune to criticism, but such criticism ought to be conducted in a scholarly manner.   
 Another consideration regarding these criticisms is where they fall on Iqbal’s 
intellectual timeline.  The first instance occurs in Asrar-i Khudi (1915) where Iqbal 
criticizes Nietzsche for having received revelation, but not being perceptive enough to 
                                                 
29
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realize it.30  Iqbal’s next set of criticisms are found in The Reconstruction of Religious 
Thought in Islam, published in 1931.  Following this, however, Iqbal’s next negative 
mentions of Nietzsche appear in Bal-i Jibril (1935) and Zarb-i Kalim (1936), either 
explicitly in the poem, or in Iqbal’s footnotes.31  Given this timeline, it also seems that 
Iqbal was consistent in his criticism of Nietzsche across his writing career. 
 Finally, one must ask the question that these criticisms warrant: If Iqbal 
selectively syncretized from and admired Nietzsche, how could he be so critical of him?  
Restated, what is the source of this ridicule?  To answer this question, one must 
acknowledge the possibility that Iqbal had difficulty detecting some of Nietzsche’s 
sarcasm in his works.  Nietzsche was a serious individual, but there are times in his works 
when his provocative statements exist primarily for shock value.  One of the difficulties 
of foreign language study is detecting the differences when an author is being serious or 
hyperbolic.  Another possibility uses the Iqbal the Nationalist Poet- Iqbal the Scholar 
paradigm.  This works for most instances, but fails to account for Iqbal’s criticisms in 
The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, where Iqbal was speaking as a scholar.  
Finally, one must ask if Iqbal really felt pity for Nietzsche, as this is the last thing 
Nietzsche would want from any of his readers.  To this final question, it is difficult to say 
if Iqbal’s pity is genuine, or for effect based on his audience.  Unfortunately these 
questions assessing Iqbal’s negative comments regarding Nietzsche are not likely to have 
satisfactory answers across all situations.  One possible explanation across instances is 
selective syncretism, in which he selects out pieces of Nietzsche’s philosophy that he 
                                                 
30
 Muhammad Iqbal, Secrets of the Self, trans. R. A. Nicholson (1920), 1915, 3-4. 
http://www.allamaiqbal.com/. Iqbal makes 2 brief criticisms of Nietzsche. 
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 Muhammad Iqbal, Gabriel’s Wing, trans. Naeem Siddiqui, 1935, 19 (in note), 51 
http://www.allamaiqbal.com/. Iqbal makes 2 brief criticisms of Nietzsche; Iqbal, The Rod of Moses, 19. 
Iqbal makes 1 brief criticism of Nietzsche. 
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cannot stomach or use, or thinks his audience would not be able to stomach or use.  The 
difference between these points is slight but profound and one’s answer paints Iqbal and 
his criticisms in different lights. 
Conclusion 
 This chapter scrutinized the various detail-oriented aspects of Iqbal’s encounter 
with Nietzsche, and discussed possible alternative explanations for Iqbal and Nietzsche’s 
convergence and divergence.  Following this discussion, instances of Iqbal’s praise and 
reproach for Nietzsche and his ideas were discussed.  These analyses were followed by 
some explanations regarding Iqbal’s praise and ridicule, and possible explanations for 
their underlying mechanisms.   
 The first part of the chapter offered a linguistic and detail-oriented 
contextualization of Iqbal’s understanding of Nietzsche, and discussed answers to several 
questions regarding the encounter.  Among the competing explanations for these 
questions, one is often left with choices that either 1) assume an extreme, and/or 2) 
require multiple valid premises and/or 3) assume Iqbal was far less intelligent than he 
seemed to demonstrate.  Ultimately these competing explanations do not seem as 
plausible when placed alongside this thesis’s proposed mechanisms of conceptions of 
religion and selective syncretism.   
 This chapter also discussed some specific instances of admiration and disdain for 
Nietzsche, and analyzed possible reasons for such admiration and criticism.  Again, 
alternative explanations for these occurrences seem lacking.  They either require Iqbal to 
shrewdly manipulate the masses, or lack consistency in his thought.  Ultimately, these 
questions must be weighed on the basis of credible evidence, which is differentiated from 
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non-credible evidence by individual bias.  However, this allows the study of, and critical 
analysis of Iqbal’s thought, and especially its relationship to Nietzsche’s to continue to 
develop.
 - 120 - 
Conclusion 
 
 This thesis relies heavily on the understanding of the terms “religious 
philosophy,” “convergence,” “divergence,” “selective syncretism,” and “conception of 
religion”.  To review this thesis’s quasi-hypotheses, it is appropriate to redefine these 
terms as they appear.  A religious philosophy is a set of ideas, the focus of which is to 
discern the role of religion in the life of an individual.  These ideas draw heavily upon 
religion and have broad implications for the role of religion in the life of an individual.  
Convergence is defined as the degree of similarity between two concepts or ideas, 
contrasted with divergence as the degree of difference between two concepts or ideas.  
Selective syncretism, as it pertains to this thesis, is the process by which Iqbal was able to 
incorporate aspects of European philosophy he felt compatible and useful to his South 
Asian context, and reject ideas either incompatible or not useful.  Finally, a conception of 
religion is defined as an all-encompassing vision of what religion is and what religion’s 
role is for society and an individual, and contains an individual’s ideas about the purpose 
and/or function of religion, as well as the origins of a religion.  These terms play a critical 
role in this thesis, and form the conceptual basis upon which the thesis explores its 
hypotheses.   
 Throughout this thesis, four quasi-hypotheses were explored regarding the 
convergence and divergence of Iqbal and Nietzsche’s religious philosophies.  The first 
dealt with the actual religious philosophies.  This thesis argued that Iqbal and Nietzsche’s 
religious philosophies, although exhibiting similarities and differences, were each unique 
intellectual achievements.  The second hypothesis explored was a possible mechanism 
underlying the observed convergence and divergence between these two religious 
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philosophies, arguing that each author’s conception of religion plays a key role in 
explaining the observed variance.  This thesis does not argue that the similarities and 
differences in conceptions of religion fully explain all the variance observed between the 
religious philosophies, but it is the most explanatory and most predictive.  The third 
quasi-hypothesis revolved around selective syncretism as a possible mechanism 
facilitating the incorporation of Nietzsche and other thinkers’ religio-philosophical ideas 
into Iqbal’s religious philosophy.  This hypothesis is related to the first regarding the 
uniqueness of each individual’s religious philosophy.  This thesis argues that the way in 
which the originality of Iqbal’s religious philosophy is preserved is through the process 
of selective syncretism.  By utilizing aspects of Nietzsche’s religious-philosophy that fit 
within Iqbal’s pre-existing ideas, Iqbal was able to develop an original, revolutionary 
Islamic religious philosophy incorporating aspects of Nietzsche’s Christian-based 
religious philosophy.  The fourth quasi-hypothesis regarded Iqbal’s actual understanding 
of Nietzsche and the cross-cultural and linguistic encounter between these two authors 
across time.  Rather than presenting an argument, the actual details of the encounter were 
discussed to demonstrate that the conceptions of religion and selective syncretism 
arguments explained more of the variance than alternative explanations.   
 This thesis also argues that scholarly exploration of these areas requires holistic 
views of each author’s religious philosophy.  A brief recapitulation of the religious 
philosophy of Iqbal and Nietzsche is thus appropriate.  Iqbal believes Islam is a socially 
oriented, individualistic religion that empowers the believer as he or she strives to 
develop the attributes of God.  By this emulation of God’s individuality (tawhid), the 
individual undergoes a three-stage religious development process, and becomes more 
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aware of the underlying obligations that ground Islam in action for social justice.  This 
greater understanding of belief and action ultimately results in the transformation of the 
individual from a mere human believer to an insan-i kamil, or Perfect Human.  The 
ultimate goal of becoming this insan-i kamil is to improve the social welfare of others, 
while continually striving for greater individuality.  All of these actions please the 
Creator, which creates a state of bliss upon death, referred to as Heaven.   
 Nietzsche’s religious philosophy is one of individual growth through the 
revaluation of all assumed values.  By determining the value that each of these values has 
within the life of the individual, he or she moves beyond absolutes and into a realm in 
which value, morality, and religion is purely that of the individual.  The individual goes 
through a three-stage metamorphosis which results in the individual unlocking his or her 
full potential once the individual has the ability to create new values, morals, and religion 
if he or she so chooses.  The goal is ultimate freedom through choice and unlimited 
creativity of the self.  This entire struggle prepares the individual to give a positive 
answer to the question of Eternal Recurrence.  Does the individual want to live for all 
eternity either the same life cycle, or different life cycles with the same values, depending 
on interpretation?  The end state of an individual who can answer affirmatively this 
thought experiment is an individual who fully embraces life, loves his or her fate as 
chosen by the individual (amor fati), and becomes the Übermensch.   
 These two religious philosophies have a remarkable amount of convergence 
paired with a significant amount of divergence.  It seems paradoxical, but when 
understood through the lens of each individual’s conception of religion and Iqbal’s 
selective syncretism, the paradoxical quality of the statement fades.  At the surface level, 
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each religious philosophy has a three-stage metamorphosis, emphasizes the individual 
and his or her empowerment above all else, and envisions similar dynamic action states.  
The differences between these religious philosophies arise from the emphases placed on 
the individual’s empowerment.  Specifically, what the goal for such empowerment is, 
how to achieve such empowerment (whether through or outside religion), and the 
dynamic action states have nuanced differences.   
 One way of viewing these similarities and differences is to say that Iqbal 
understood Nietzsche “correctly” at certain points and misunderstood others.  This 
position has some validity in that it is possible some of the differences are due to Iqbal’s 
misunderstanding, implying the religious philosophies have more convergence than this 
thesis argues.  However, it is a risky proposition both scholarly and philosophically to 
make such statements for two reasons.  The first is that such a statement assumes that 
there are categorically correct and incorrect interpretations of Iqbal’s and Nietzsche’s 
religious philosophy.  Second, it assumes Nietzsche’s religious philosophy is inherently 
correct, and that Iqbal’s correctness is contingent upon its synchronization with 
Nietzsche’s.  One way to avoid falling into this philosophical trap is to look for a 
mechanism that might regulate or influence each author’s formation of a religious 
philosophy.  This is precisely what this thesis seeks to do by presenting the idea of a 
religious conception coupled with selective syncretism.   
 Yet this proposition raises the question of whether the observed patterns can be 
reduced to two basic concepts as these.  Initially, such a hypothesis seems overly 
reductionist, but proper evaluation reveals it to be a fuller, more explanatory and more 
predictive reason for the observed variance versus competing explanations.  Other key 
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factors in the formation of a religious philosophy are an individual’s education and 
context, but these are incapable of accounting for the entirety of the variance between 
Iqbal and Nietzsche’s religious philosophy.  Such explanations would reduce Iqbal’s 
religious philosophy to a Persian and Urdu translation of Nietzsche’s religious 
philosophy.  Additionally, such an explanation cannot fully reconcile the differences 
between the two religious philosophies, or Iqbal’s criticisms of Nietzsche’s ideas.  
Furthermore, relying solely on context, or context and education, would mean that neither 
philosophy is really original, and merely a product of each individual’s context and 
education.  Such an extreme environmental view is hard to sustain given the holistic 
paradigm within this thesis.  Given these criticisms of other approaches, this thesis argues 
that the convergence and divergence in conceptions of religion best explains the variance 
in the religious philosophies.   
 This thesis also argues that each individual’s unique conception of religion was 
related to their context and education, but also shaped by their assessments of the human 
condition.  Iqbal’s conception of religion is multivocal, broad, and generally positive 
regarding the role of religion within the life of an individual and society.  Nietzsche’s 
concept is univocal, narrow compared to Iqbal’s, and generally negative regarding the 
impact of religion on the individual and society.  Iqbal views religion’s purpose as 
transformative for individuals, compelling them to act in ways that better their societies.  
By pursuing social justice, the individual is empowered, increasingly unique by imitating 
God’s attributes, and aware of esoteric religious knowledge.  Nietzsche believes that by 
following one’s chosen values, one becomes empowered and creative with or without 
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religion.  However, in Nietzsche’s view of history and how religion functions, full 
individual empowerment without discarding religion is unlikely.   
 These basic tenets form their respective conceptions of religion, which in turn 
inform and shape the development of their religious philosophies.  At times, these 
conceptions of religion merge, as they do along the lines of the importance of the 
individual, the importance of action, and the importance of experience.  At times, these 
conceptions of religion diverge, as seen in their view of the general role of religion for 
the individual, the origin of religion, and their views of religion and the individual within 
their given contexts.     
 A puzzling aspect of this thesis centers on Iqbal’s concurrent admiration and 
criticism of Nietzsche.  Intuitively, it would seem that for an individual to draw upon 
another’s ideas, a degree of admiration or respect must exist.  Generally criticism is 
rooted in a variety of more or less valid reasons.  Iqbal’s criticisms can be classified into 
three categories: 1) criticisms based on religious conception, 2) failures in 
comprehension, or 3) simple ad hominem.  Overall, Iqbal’s praises and criticisms are best 
explained by conception of religion and selective syncretism.  Where his conception 
merged with Nietzsche’s, he selectively syncretized and admired Nietzsche for his 
contributions to general religio-philosophical thought.  Where they did not coincide, 
Iqbal rejected and criticized Nietzsche’s ideas, sometimes descending into ad hominem 
attacks.  These attacks on Nietzsche’s person are the most difficult to reconcile with the 
thesis’s proposed mechanisms.  As such, this thesis yields to other plausible explanations, 
the most instructive being the Iqbal as Scholar and Nationalist Poet binary.  Iqbal the 
Scholar could read Nietzsche’s more provocative statements and react professionally to 
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such statements.  Iqbal the Nationalist Poet was far more emotive and polemical against 
the enemies of his religious philosophy and Western European colonial powers and 
influences.  Other explanations include Iqbal’s disdain for European colonization, which 
may have colored Iqbal’s reading of Nietzsche and other European thinkers.  
Additionally, it is possible that Iqbal reacted poorly to some of Nietzsche’s statements 
because he failed to understand the nuance of German sarcasm and provocative 
expression for shock value.   
 All three of these explanations are plausible to some degree, but this thesis 
regards the first explanation of Iqbal’s two attitudes is most consistent with his overall 
philosophy.  However, this calls Iqbal’s sincerity and consistency into question.  Did he 
change his statements to fit his audience, even if they went against his beliefs?  Did he 
hold some of his beliefs back because it would have affected the popularity and influence 
of his message?  In the end, each reader must decide what evidence is most compelling 
regarding this Iqbal’s “love-hate” relationship with Nietzsche.   
 In closing, this thesis has argued for the consideration of similar and differing 
conceptions of religion and selective syncretism as the prominent underlying mechanisms 
behind Iqbal and Nietzsche’s similarity and difference.  One of the primary points this 
thesis emphasized is the importance of holistic understandings that capture the nuances in 
religious philosophies.  To state that one definitively knows what Iqbal or Nietzsche 
means on any given subject is a bold claim, and ought to be subject to close scrutiny.  
This thesis does not claim to have the definitive interpretation of these two authors.  
Instead, it argues a plurality of interpretations exists, of which some, such as this thesis, 
are more supported by evidence.   
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 Integral to this thesis and the research process in general is the use of primary 
sources.  Reading the authors’ own words in their original works coupled with a thorough 
contextual understanding of the authors and their works is critical to conducting quality 
research.  Where possible, this thesis has endeavored to use primary sources in the 
original language, or reliable translations.  The importance of using primary sources 
flows into the importance of properly contextualizing one’s arguments and the arguments 
one analyzes.  It is impossible to understand Iqbal and Nietzsche without understanding 
these individuals’ unique backgrounds.  This thesis gave a reasonable level of 
biographical information to contextualize each religious philosopher to help elucidate 
some of their more difficult concepts.   
 Finally, this thesis has attempted to remain faithful to the authors’ intended 
message, factoring in their contexts and target audiences.  Neither Iqbal nor Nietzsche 
ever wrote any of their ideas with this thesis in mind, and instead wrote to a specific 
audience with a specific purpose.  In order to provide the most compelling case for this 
thesis’s quasi-hypotheses, every attempt was made to consider the intended audience as 
part of the context of the argument.   
 Iqbal lives on in the legacy of modern-day Pakistan.  Part of the relevance of this 
thesis is that it adds to the literature surrounding the individual credited as the intellectual 
father of Pakistan.  The fact that such a progressive individual is associated with the 
modern state of Pakistan raises questions regarding the individual’s beliefs.  One of the 
goals of this thesis is to shed further light on Iqbal as an intellectual separate from the 
current problems in Pakistan.  This is especially true when his words are used in sermons 
in non-Urdu speaking areas to justify actions entirely contrary to his beliefs.  
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 An interview was conducted with an individual, who will remain anonymous for 
security reasons, to understand Iqbal’s legacy among the Pashto in the northwestern part 
of Pakistan.  Iqbal’s poetry is invoked for a variety of reasons, from preparing individuals 
to cross borders into Afghanistan and attack US soldiers to accusing the Pashtos of not 
being true Muslims.1  The interesting way in which Iqbal is used by various individuals 
throughout the northwestern part of Pakistan demonstrates the breadth of interpretation 
possible with Iqbal.2  In areas where orality trumps literacy, Iqbal’s poetry, touching on a 
variety of subjects, can be applied in nearly any situation.3  This is especially true of 
Iqbal’s poetry, which derives its meaning and power based on surrounding verses, or in 
the case of the Pashtos, sermon topics.4  This thesis has argued that although a multitude 
of interpretations are possible, not all are equally valid.  Iqbal was not a violent individual 
and would have condemned using his poetry to incite violence.  Despite the disparity in 
Iqbal’s applications in northwest Pakistan, he remains immensely popular in the state that 
he envisioned.  Yet, despite this popularity, his words are not heeded in contemporary 
Pakistan.     
 Second, this thesis adds to the body of literature asserting that Iqbal is neither a 
Muslim Nietzsche nor unaffiliated with Nietzsche.  Both extreme camps of thought are 
incorrect as Iqbal and Nietzsche were two individuals who believed they were 
revolutionizing the way others thought.   Finally, this thesis adds to the body of literature 
that presents a challenge to the Clash of Civilizations theory of Samuel Huntington by 
demonstrating that Iqbal, a fully “Eastern Islamo-Confucian” South Asian Muslim, 
                                                 
1
 Interview with an anonymous colleague, February 10, 2010. 
2
 Ibid. 
3
 Ibid. 
4
 Ibid. 
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admired and incorporated rather well Nietzsche’s ideas, which are fully “Western Judeo-
Christian” European and secular.  By describing Iqbal as a modernist Muslim religious 
philosopher, this thesis offers a powerful challenge to Clash of Civilizations Theory.  One 
of the philosophical characteristics of modernity is the emphasis on the individual’s 
responsibility.  Nietzsche’s thought, contextualized in nineteenth-century Europe, is 
viewed by scholars as quintessentially modern.  His description of the individual as 
achieving empowerment by removing all obstacles to his or her sovereign choice is seen 
as a modernist treatise on individualism.  Iqbal’s description of achieving individual 
empowerment is identical to Nietzsche’s in both structure and process, making his 
emphasis on the individual modernist.  The only alternatives to this conclusion require 
changing one’s conception of philosophical modernity, regarding Nietzsche as something 
other than a modernist, or discarding Iqbal as a religio-philosophical fluke among 
Muslims.  These first two options are absurd to consider, leaving the third as a possible 
alternative.  However, Iqbal’s continuing prominence in Pakistan as its intellectual father 
makes this alternative null and void.  Given this analysis, Iqbal, a devout Muslim, was 
also a modernist.  Taking this further, the questions concerning Islam’s compatibility 
with modernity are moot.  Iqbal, and his continuing relevance as the intellectual father of 
the second largest Muslim state and the only state ever created specifically for Muslims, 
refutes Huntington’s theory.  The question, then, of the current status of democracy, civil 
and political liberties, and violence is not inherent in the pre-modern religion of Islam, 
but found instead by analyzing other relevant factors such as colonization and its effects 
and the proliferation of weapons.   
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 The relationship between Iqbal and Nietzsche can be viewed as one that Nietzsche 
might have approved of when he said this in Ecce Homo: 
 I want no “believers”…I have a terrible fear that one day I will be pronounced 
holy…5   
 
Iqbal was never a “believer” in Nietzsche, but another religious philosopher who 
appreciated Nietzsche’s contributions to thought, and per Nietzsche’s desires, never 
pronounced him holy.  
                                                 
5
 Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo: How One Becomes What One Is, Translated by Walter Kaufmann (New 
York: Vintage, 1967), 326. 
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